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Double Standards in Educational Standards – Do Schools with a Disadvantaged Student Body Grade More Leniently?

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  • Himmler Oliver

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany)

  • Schwager Robert

    (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany)

Abstract

A simple model of decentralized graduation standards is presented. It is shown that a school whose students are disadvantaged on the labor market applies less demanding standards because such students have lower ability or less incentives to graduate. The model’s predictions are tested using Dutch school-level data. Since students in the Netherlands have to participate in both a central and a school specific examination, we can identify the grading policy of individual schools. We find that schools which harbor greater shares of disadvantaged students tend to set lower standards. This association is most pronounced in the track of secondary schooling that prepares for university.

Suggested Citation

  • Himmler Oliver & Schwager Robert, 2013. "Double Standards in Educational Standards – Do Schools with a Disadvantaged Student Body Grade More Leniently?," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 166-189, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:14:y:2013:i:2:p:166-189
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2012.00563.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Tampieri, 2016. "Social background effects on school and job opportunities," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(5), pages 496-510, September.
    2. Robert Schwager, 2018. "Majority Vote on Educational Standards," CESifo Working Paper Series 6845, CESifo.
    3. repec:got:cegedp:143 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Schwager, Robert, 2013. "Majority Vote on Educational Standards," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79971, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Stefano STAFFOLANI & Maria Cristina RECCHIONI, 2016. "Increasing Graduation and Calling for More Autonomy in Higher Education: Is It a Good Thing? A Theoretical Model," Working Papers 419, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    6. Ehlers, Tim & Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Honest grading, grade inflation and reputation," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 143, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education; grading; social status; schools; Netherlands;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination

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