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External Monitors And Score Manipulation In Italian Schools: Symptomatic Treatment Or Cure?

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Bertoni

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali "Marco Fanno", Università di Padova)

  • Giorgio Brunello

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali "Marco Fanno", Università di Padova)

  • Marco Alberto De Benedetto

    (Dipartimento di Economia, Università degli Studi di Messina,)

  • Maria De Paola

    (Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF, Università della Calabria)

Abstract

We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to school institutes in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners, and is stronger for open-ended questions, for small school institutes, and for institutes located in the northern and central regions of the country. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that monitoring is a symptomatic treatment rather than a cure of score manipulation. We discuss learning, reputational concerns, peer pressure and teacher preferences as potential mechanisms behind our findings, and present some evidence on the role played by social capital and high stakes.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Bertoni & Giorgio Brunello & Marco Alberto De Benedetto & Maria De Paola, 2019. "External Monitors And Score Manipulation In Italian Schools: Symptomatic Treatment Or Cure?," Working Papers 201907, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    • Handle: RePEc:clb:wpaper:201907
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    File URL: http://www.ecostat.unical.it/RePEc/WorkingPapers/WP07_2019.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Bertoni, Marco & Brunello, Giorgio & De Benedetto, Marco Alberto & De Paola, Maria, 2021. "Does monitoring deter future cheating? The case of external examiners in Italian schools," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    education; testing; external monitoring; long-run effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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