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Not Welcome Anymore: The Effect of Electoral Incentives on the Reception of Refugees

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  • Matteo Gamalerio

Abstract

Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? I study this question in the setting of Italian municipalities making decisions about the reception of refugees. The localized control of the reception policy (SPRAR), combined with the exogenous timing of policy decisions and staggered elections, enables me to study the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees. Although municipalities receive fiscal grants for hosting refugees, electoral incentives reduce the probability of opening a refugee centre by 24 per cent. The effect is driven by voters’ misperceptions of immigrants and by extreme-right political preferences. The results explain why is difficult to reach an equal redistribution of refugees across and within countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Gamalerio, 2018. "Not Welcome Anymore: The Effect of Electoral Incentives on the Reception of Refugees," CESifo Working Paper Series 7212, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7212
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bellucci, Davide & Conzo, Pierluigi & Zotti, Roberto, 2019. "Perceived Immigration And Voting Behavior," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201915, University of Turin.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    migration; reception of refugees; electoral incentives; fiscal grants;

    JEL classification:

    • R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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