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The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil

Author

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  • Fernanda Brollo
  • Katja Kaufmann
  • Eliana La Ferrara

Abstract

Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We study the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in increasing penalties. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance around the 2008 municipal elections. We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the president is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. We provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance, particularly in municipalities with a higher fraction of students in schools with politically connected principals.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernanda Brollo & Katja Kaufmann & Eliana La Ferrara, 2020. "The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 750-791.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:18:y:2020:i:2:p:750-791.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jeea/jvz024
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    Cited by:

    1. Pranab Bardhan & Sandip Mitra & Dilip Mookherjee & Anusha Nath, 2020. "How Do Voters Respond to Welfare vis-à-vis Public Good Programs? An Empirical Test for Clientelism," Staff Report 605, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    2. Gustavo J. Bobonis & Paul J. Gertler & Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Simeon Nichter, 2022. "Vulnerability and Clientelism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(11), pages 3627-3659, November.
    3. Matteo Gamalerio, 2018. "Not Welcome Anymore: The Effect of Electoral Incentives on the Reception of Refugees," CESifo Working Paper Series 7212, CESifo.
    4. Axel Eizmendi Larrinaga & Germ'an Reyes, 2025. "Cash and Cognition: The Impact of Transfer Timing on Standardized Test Performance and Human Capital," Papers 2507.21393, arXiv.org.
    5. Guo, Jingyuan & Deng, Kent, 2024. "Laying off old guards to rebuild state capacity: Deng Xiaoping’s bloodless coup d’etat in post-Mao China, 1980-2000," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 126083, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Cepaluni, Gabriel & Driscoll, Amanda, 2025. "Do conditional cash transfers improve intergenerational gains in educational achievement?: Evidence from Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    7. repec:ehl:wpaper:126083 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Gonzalez, Felipe & Prem, Mounu, 2025. "Government Support in Times of Crisis: Transfers and the Road to Socialism," OSF Preprints vnz6d_v1, Center for Open Science.
    9. Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Benjamin A. Olken & Diana Sverdlin Lisker, 2024. "Social Protection in the Developing World," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1349-1421, December.
    10. Duchoslav, Jan & Kenamu, Edwin & Thunde, Jack, 2023. "Targeting hunger or votes? The political economy of humanitarian transfers in Malawi," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    11. Gerard,François & Naritomi,Joana & Silva,Joana C. G., 2021. "Cash Transfers and Formal Labor Markets : Evidence from Brazil : Cash Transfers and the Local Economy: Evidence from Brazil," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9778, The World Bank.
    12. Barreto, Yuri & Britto, Diogo & Carrillo, Bladimir & Da Mata, Daniel & Emanuel, Lucas & Sampaio, Breno, 2025. "Cisterns for Life: Climate Adaptation Policies for Water Provision and Rural Lives," IZA Discussion Papers 18250, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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