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Social Protection in the Developing World

Author

Listed:
  • Abhijit Banerjee
  • Rema Hanna
  • Benjamin A. Olken
  • Diana Sverdlin Lisker

Abstract

Social protection programs have become increasingly widespread in low- and middle-income countries, with their own distinct characteristics to match the environments in which they are operating. This paper reviews the growing literature on the design and impact of these programs. We review how to identify potential beneficiaries given the large informal sector, the design and implementation of redistribution and income support programs, and the challenges and potential of social insurance. We use our frameworks as a guide for consolidating and organizing the existing literature, and also to highlight areas and questions for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Benjamin A. Olken & Diana Sverdlin Lisker, 2024. "Social Protection in the Developing World," NBER Working Papers 32382, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32382
    Note: DEV PE
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ana L. De La O, 2013. "Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 1-14, January.
    2. Fernanda Brollo & Katja Kaufmann & Eliana La Ferrara, 2020. "The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 750-791.
    3. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
    4. Rohini Pande, 2003. "Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1132-1151, September.
    5. Pop-Eleches, Cristian & Pop-Eleches, Grigore, 2012. "Targeted Government Spending and Political Preferences," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 7(3), pages 285-320, June.
    6. Thomas Fujiwara, 2015. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 423-464, March.
    7. Labonne, Julien, 2013. "The local electoral impacts of conditional cash transfers," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 73-88.
    8. Emily Conover & Román A. Zárate & Adriana Camacho & Javier E. Baez, 2020. "Cash and Ballots: Conditional Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 541-566.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jiayi Wen & Xiaoqing Yu, 2024. "Insuring Long-Term Care in Developing Countries: The Interaction between Formal and Informal Insurance," Papers 2408.14243, arXiv.org.
    2. Benjamin A. Olken & Rema Hanna & Phitawat Poonpolkul & Nada Wasi, 2024. "Willingness-To-Pay vs Administrative Hurdles: Understanding Barriers to Social Insurance Enrollment in Thailand," PIER Discussion Papers 223, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Adrienne M. Lucas & Patrick J. McEwan & David Torres Irribarra, 2025. "Targeted Education Transfers Reduced Long-Run and Intergenerational Ethnic Inequality in Chile," NBER Working Papers 33798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Jingyi Fang & Yasuyuki Sawada, 2024. "On the effectiveness of insurance mechanisms for older individuals in China," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 1007-1040, December.
    5. Tesliuc, Emil Daniel & Martinez Cordova, Ana Sofia, 2025. "Mind the Gap : Coverage, Adequacy, and Financing Gaps in Social Protection for the Extreme Poor and the Poorest Quintile," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 200255, The World Bank.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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