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Multi-Market Contact in International Trade; Evidence from U.S. Battery Exporters

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  • James R. Boohaker

Abstract

When competitors compete in more than one market they are said to have multi-market contact (MMC). Firms with MMC are more likely collude to avoid cross-market retaliation. This paper investigates the impact of MMC among U.S. battery exporters on the prices they set in foreign markets using confidential export transaction data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. The ability of firms to exploit MMC for collusive gain in international markets can be both detrimental to import-dependent consumers and harder for anti-trust authorities to detect. Motivated by litigation finding evidence of collusive behavior by multi-national battery manufacturers, MMC has an upward effect on export prices set by U.S. battery exporters. These results are robust across different panel regression specifications using different measures of MMC.

Suggested Citation

  • James R. Boohaker, 2025. "Multi-Market Contact in International Trade; Evidence from U.S. Battery Exporters," Working Papers 25-32, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    • Handle: RePEc:cen:wpaper:25-32
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment

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