Multimarket contact and export entry
Despite a well-developed literature on implications of multimarket contact among firms for performance in domestic markets, only recently has theoretical and empirical work turned to similar issues in international trade. In this paper, I consider the possibility that exporters meeting rivals in multiple markets will be reluctant to enter (via exports) the home markets of those rivals. Empirical results using trade data (during 2007–2010) for the fats and oils industry support this hypothesis.
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- Philip M. Parker & Lars-Hendrik Roller, 1997. "Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 304-322, Summer.
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- Ciliberto, Federico & Williams, Jonathan, 2010. "Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conjectural Parameters in the Airline Industry," MPRA Paper 24888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Corwin D. Edwards, 1955. "Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power," NBER Chapters,in: Business Concentration and Price Policy, pages 331-359 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Jans, Ivette & Rosenbaum, David I., 1997. "Multimarket contact and pricing: Evidence from the U.S. cement industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 391-412, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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