IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bis/biswps/962.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Global lending conditions and international coordination of financial regulation policies

Author

Listed:
  • Enisse Kharroubi

Abstract

Using a model of strategic interactions between two countries, I investigate the gains to international coordination of financial regulation policies, and how these gains depend on global lending conditions. When global lending conditions are determined non-cooperatively, I show that coordinating regulatory policies leads to a Pareto improvement relative to the case of no cooperation. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, one region - the core - determines global lending conditions, leaving the other region - the periphery - in a sub-optimal situation. The periphery then tightens regulatory policy to reduce the cost of sub-optimal lending conditions. Yet, in doing so, it fails to internalise a cross-border externality: tightening regulatory policy in one region limits ex ante borrowing in the other region, which increases the cost of sub-optimal lending conditions for the periphery. The equilibrium with cooperative regulatory policies can then improve on this outcome as both regions take into account the cross-border externality and allow for larger ex ante borrowing, ending in a lower cost of suboptimal lending conditions for the periphery.

Suggested Citation

  • Enisse Kharroubi, 2021. "Global lending conditions and international coordination of financial regulation policies," BIS Working Papers 962, Bank for International Settlements.
  • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:962
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bis.org/publ/work962.pdf
    File Function: Full PDF document
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.bis.org/publ/work962.htm
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Forbes, Kristin & Fratzscher, Marcel & Kostka, Thomas & Straub, Roland, 2016. "Bubble thy neighbour: Portfolio effects and externalities from capital controls," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-104.
    2. Akinci, Ozge & Olmstead-Rumsey, Jane, 2018. "How effective are macroprudential policies? An empirical investigation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 33-57.
    3. Bowman, David & Londono, Juan M. & Sapriza, Horacio, 2015. "U.S. unconventional monetary policy and transmission to emerging market economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 27-59.
    4. Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 57-95.
    5. Han, Xuehui & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2018. "International transmissions of monetary shocks: Between a trilemma and a dilemma," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 205-219.
    6. Bruno, Valentina & Shim, Ilhyock & Shin, Hyun Song, 2017. "Comparative assessment of macroprudential policies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 183-202.
    7. Albagli, Elias & Ceballos, Luis & Claro, Sebastian & Romero, Damian, 2019. "Channels of US monetary policy spillovers to international bond markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(2), pages 447-473.
    8. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
    9. Gromb, Denis & Vayanos, Dimitri, 2002. "Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained arbitrageurs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 361-407.
    10. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 60-93, February.
    11. Coman, Andra & Lloyd, Simon P., 2022. "In the face of spillovers: Prudential policies in emerging economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    12. Anton Korinek & Alp Simsek, 2016. "Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(3), pages 699-738, March.
    13. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2010. "Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 403-407, May.
    14. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 2002. "Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 503-535.
    15. Bengui, Julien & Bianchi, Javier, 2022. "Macroprudential policy with leakages," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    16. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2020. "Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 1470-1497.
    17. Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2003. "Excessive Dollar Debt: Financial Development and Underinsurance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 867-894, April.
    18. Shekhar Aiyar & Charles W. Calomiris & Tomasz Wieladek, 2014. "Does Macro‐Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(s1), pages 181-214, February.
    19. Eichengreen, Barry, 2013. "Currency war or international policy coordination?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 425-433.
    20. Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2003. "Excessive Dollar Debt: Financial Development and Underinsurance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 867-893, April.
    21. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2016. "A Theory of Macroprudential Policies in the Presence of Nominal Rigidities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1645-1704, September.
    22. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 1973-2030, Elsevier.
    23. Rey, Hélène, 2015. "Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10591, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Bagliano, Fabio C. & Morana, Claudio, 2012. "The Great Recession: US dynamics and spillovers to the world economy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-13.
    25. Rakesh Mohan & Muneesh Kapur, 2014. "Monetary Policy Coordination and the Role of Central Banks," IMF Working Papers 2014/070, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ansgar Walther, 2016. "Jointly Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2-3), pages 415-448, March.
    2. Jeanne, Olivier & Korinek, Anton, 2019. "Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 2-17.
    3. Bilge Erten & Anton Korinek & José Antonio Ocampo, 2021. "Capital Controls: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 45-89, March.
    4. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95, July.
    5. Stijn Claessens, 2015. "An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 397-422, December.
    6. Norring, Anni, 2022. "Taming the tides of capital: Review of capital controls and macroprudential policy in emerging economies," BoF Economics Review 1/2022, Bank of Finland.
    7. Anton Korinek, 2017. "Currency wars or efficient spillovers?," BIS Working Papers 615, Bank for International Settlements.
    8. Anton Korinek, 2016. "Currency Wars or Efficient Spillovers? A General Theory of International Policy Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 23004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Javier Bianchi & Guido Lorenzoni, 2021. "The Prudential Use of Capital Controls and Foreign Currency Reserves," Working Papers 787, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    10. Sandri, Damiano & Bergant, Katharina & Grigoli, Francesco & Hansen, Niels-Jakob, 2020. "Dampening Global Financial Shocks: Can Macroprudential Regulation Help (More than Capital Controls)?," CEPR Discussion Papers 14948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva, 2022. "Financial spillovers, spillbacks, and the scope for international macroprudential policy coordination," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 79-127, February.
    12. Freixas, Xavier & Perez-Reyna, David, 2021. "Optimal macroprudential policy and rational bubbles," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 46(C).
    13. Javier Bianchi, 2022. "The Research Agenda: Javier Bianchi on Financial Crises and Prudential Policies," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 23(1), April.
    14. Ansgar Walther, 2014. "Jointly optimal regulation of bank capital and maturity structure," Economics Series Working Papers 725, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    15. Alessandro Rebucci & Chang Ma, 2019. "Capital Controls: A Survey of the New Literature," NBER Working Papers 26558, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Chang Ma & John H. Rogers & Sili Zhou, 2019. "The Effect of the China Connect," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-087, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. Bank for International Settlements, 2021. "Changing patterns of capital flows," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 66, August.
    18. Lorenzoni, Guido, 2014. "International Financial Crises," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 689-740, Elsevier.
    19. Das, Mitali & Ordal, Hailey, 2022. "Macroeconomic stability or financial stability: How are capital controls used? Insights from a new database," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    20. Fendoğlu, Salih, 2017. "Credit cycles and capital flows: Effectiveness of the macroprudential policy framework in emerging market economies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 110-128.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulatory policy; global financial conditions; international coordination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:962. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Beslmeisl (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bisssch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.