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Just round the corner? Pros, cons, and implementation issues of a fiscal union for the euro area

Author

Listed:
  • Fabrizio Balassone

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Sandro Momigliano

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Marzia Romanelli

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Pietro Tommasino

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

The experience of other successful monetary unions and economic theory suggest that the euro area would benefit from the establishment of a supranational fiscal capacity. Institutional reforms prompted by the crisis (e.g., the European Stability Mechanism and the banking union) are introducing though to a limited extent elements of cross-country risk sharing. Nevertheless, further steps are probably needed. Proposals to create a sort of rainy-day fund present major practical difficulties associated, inter alia, to the uncertainty characterizing the identification of shocks in real time. A more appropriate solution, consistent with how risk sharing operates in existing federations, may be centralizing specific public functions (for instance, by introducing a common unemployment benefit scheme). We argue that consideration could also be given to the creation of a euro-wide, notional defined-contribution pension scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Balassone & Sandro Momigliano & Marzia Romanelli & Pietro Tommasino, 2014. "Just round the corner? Pros, cons, and implementation issues of a fiscal union for the euro area," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 245, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_245_14
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Brandolini & Francesca Carta & Francesco D'Amuri, 2016. "A Feasible Unemployment-Based Shock Absorber for the Euro Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 1123-1141, September.
    2. Fabrizio Balassone & Sara Cecchetti & Martina Cecioni & Marika Cioffi & Wanda Cornacchia & Flavia Corneli & Gabriele Semeraro, 2016. "Risk Reduction and Risk Sharing in the Governance of the Euro Area," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 463-488.
    3. Fabrizio Balassone & Sara Cecchetti & Martina Cecioni & Marika Cioffi & Wanda Cornacchia & Flavia Corneli & Gabriele Semeraro, 2018. "Economic governance in the euro area: balancing risk reduction and risk sharing," Chapters, in: Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard E. Wagner (ed.), Debt Default and Democracy, chapter 7, pages 124-154, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Francesco Spadafora, 2020. "Completing the Economic and Monetary Union: Wisdom Come Late?," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(3), pages 379-409, November.
    5. Olanubi, Sijuola Orioye & Osode, Oluwanbepelumi Esther & Adegboye, Abiodun Adewale, 2020. "Public sector efficiency in the design of a euro-area social benefit scheme," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 615-627.
    6. Riccardo De Bonis, 2016. "What Piketty said in Capital in the Twenty-first Century and how economists reacted," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 130, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    7. Alessandro Borin & Elisa Macchi & Michele Mancini, 2018. "Eu transfers and euroscepticism: can’t buy me love?," ECON - Working Papers 289, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. Burriel, Pablo & Chronis, Panagiotis & Freier, Maximilian & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Reiss, Lukas & Stegarescu, Dan & Van Parys, Stefan, 2020. "A fiscal capacity for the euro area: lessons from existing fiscal-federal systems," Occasional Paper Series 239, European Central Bank.
    9. Francesco Spadafora, 2019. "European integration in the time of mistrust," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 512, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal union; intergovernmental transfers; risk sharing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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