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Trust and the Welfare State: The Twin Peaks Curve

  • Yann Algan

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Pierre Cahuc

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique)

  • Marc Sangnier

    ()

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - Aix-Marseille Univ. - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM))

We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-01000117.

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Date of creation: Jun 2014
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01000117
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  1. Algan, Yann & Shleifer, Andrei, 2013. "Teaching Practices and Social Capital," Scholarly Articles 11878804, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Corneo, Giacomo & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2001. "Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2694, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  8. Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2001. "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 500-528, June.
  9. Andreas Bergh & Christian Bjørnskov, 2011. "Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the Welfare State," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, 02.
  10. La Ferrara, Eliana & Alesina, Alberto, 2005. "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities," Scholarly Articles 4552533, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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  12. Francis X. Diebold & Celia Chen, 1993. "Testing structural stability with endogenous break point: a size comparison of analytic and bootstrap procedures," Working Papers 93-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  13. R. I. Luttens & M.A. Valfort, 2008. "Voting for redistribution under desert-sensitive altruism," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 08/531, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
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  16. Donald W. K. Andrews, 2003. "Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with Unknown Change Point: A Corrigendum," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 395-397, January.
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