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Gender differences in an endogenous timing conflict game

Author

Listed:
  • Philip J. Grossman

    (Monash University)

  • Youngseok Park

    (Colby College)

  • Jean Paul Rabanal

    (Monash University)

  • Olga A. Rud

    (RMIT Univeristy)

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the role of gender on social welfare outcomes in a strategic commitment game of incomplete information. In our baseline treatment, players simultaneously commit to either a Hawkish action, which leads to a private payoff, or a Dovish action, which can enhance social welfare. We add a sequential and an endogenous move treatment, where in the former, the first mover is exogenously selected and in the latter, players self-select the order of play. The two additional treatments relax the commitment constraint for the second mover. We find that (i) social welfare is significantly improved in the last two treatments and (ii) the outcome in the endogenous move treatment is mainly driven by gender. Men are willing to play the risky Dovish action more often than women.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip J. Grossman & Youngseok Park & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A. Rud, 2019. "Gender differences in an endogenous timing conflict game," Working Papers 141, Peruvian Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:apc:wpaper:141
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gender; type uncertainty; endogenous timing; laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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