IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/e/ppe184.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Marcin Peski

Personal Details

First Name:Marcin
Middle Name:
Last Name:Peski
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppe184
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://webspace.utexas.edu/mp25662/www/
Terminal Degree: (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Toronto

Toronto, Canada
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/

: (416) 978-4724

150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario
RePEc:edi:deutoca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Molinari, Francesca & Peski, Marcin, 2005. "Generalization of a Result on "Regression, Short and Long"," Working Papers 05-09, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.

Articles

  1. Peski, Marcin, 2008. "Repeated games with incomplete information on one side," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  2. Peski, Marcin, 2008. "Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 732-735, March.
  3. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March.
  4. Molinari, Francesca & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Generalization Of A Result On," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(01), pages 159-163, February.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000273, David K. Levine.
    2. Liu, Qingmin, 2015. "Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 49-75.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Working Papers 054-2013, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    4. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-116.
    5. Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg, 2014. "Intrinsic Correlation in Games," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 4, pages 59-111 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Cappelletti Giuseppe, 2010. "A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, September.
    7. Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
    8. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
    9. Dinah Rosenberg & Ehud Lehrer & Eran Shmaya, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interest," Post-Print hal-00528396, HAL.
    10. Barbie, Martin & Gupta, Abhishek, 2014. "The topology of information on the space of probability measures over Polish spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 98-111.
    11. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Faruk Gul, 2007. "The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000345, UCLA Department of Economics.
    12. Pintér, Miklós, 2011. "Invariance under type morphisms: the bayesian Nash equilibrium," MPRA Paper 38499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    14. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
    15. Van Zandt, Timothy, 2010. "Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 249-263, January.
    16. Amanda Friedenberg & Martin Meier, 2011. "On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(3), pages 377-399, April.
    17. Andrés Perea & Willemien Kets, 2016. "When Do Types Induce the Same Belief Hierarchy?," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(4), pages 1-17, October.
    18. Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2009. "An Explicit Approach to Modeling Finite-Order Type Spaces and Applications," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt8hq7j89k, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    19. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
    20. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
    21. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics.
    22. Giacomo Bonanno & Elias Tsakas, 2017. "Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games," Working Papers 175, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    23. Astrid Gamba, 2011. "On the Evolution of Preferences," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-032, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    24. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    25. Łukasz Balbus & Paweł Dziewulski & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2015. "Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 201-243, May.
    26. Esponda, Ignacio, 2013. "Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    27. Tang, Qianfeng, 2010. "The Bayesian Solution and Hierarchies of Beliefs," MPRA Paper 26811, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    28. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2015. "Invariance to representation of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 142-156.
    29. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Post-Print hal-01069192, HAL.
    30. Penta, Antonio, 2013. "On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    31. Pintér, Miklós & Udvari, Zsolt, 2011. "Generalized type spaces," MPRA Paper 34107, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    32. Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2013. "The e-mail game phenomenon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 147-156.
    33. Tang, Qianfeng, 2010. "Interim Partially Correlated Rationalizability," MPRA Paper 26810, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    34. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
    35. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Interim partially correlated rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 36-44.
    36. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2017. "Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 82-87.
    37. Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2016. "Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 179-208.
    38. Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2013. "Finite-order type spaces and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 689-719.
    39. Amanda Friedenberg & Martin Meier, 2017. "The context of the game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 347-386, February.
    40. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    41. Du, Songzi, 2012. "Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 74-87.

Articles

  1. Peski, Marcin, 2008. "Repeated games with incomplete information on one side," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.

    Cited by:

    1. Kimmo Berg & Gijs Schoenmakers, 2017. "Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14, November.
    2. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
    4. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," Les Cahiers de Recherche 1009, HEC Paris.
    5. Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.

  2. Peski, Marcin, 2008. "Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 732-735, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Elie Appelbaum & Mark Melatos, 2014. "Option Values and the Choice of Trade Agreements," Working Papers 2014_1, York University, Department of Economics.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Working Papers 054-2013, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    3. Taneva, Ina A, 2015. "Information Design," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-50, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    4. Cheng, Jianqiang & Leung, Janny & Lisser, Abdel, 2016. "Random-payoff two-person zero-sum game with joint chance constraints," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 252(1), pages 213-219.
    5. Elie Appelbaum & Mark Melatos, 2016. "How Can Uncertainty Affect the Choice of Trade Agreements?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 92(297), pages 153-172, June.
    6. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Post-Print hal-01069192, HAL.
    7. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," ESE Discussion Papers 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

  3. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Molinari, Francesca & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Generalization Of A Result On," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(01), pages 159-163, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthew A. Masten & Alexandre Poirier, 2017. "Identification of Treatment Effects under Conditional Partial Independence," Papers 1707.09563, arXiv.org.
    2. Matthew Masten & Alexandre Poirier, 2016. "Partial independence in nonseparable models," CeMMAP working papers CWP26/16, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    3. David Pacini, 2012. "Least Square Linear Prediction with Two-Sample Data," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/631, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2005-01-09 2007-04-09

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Marcin Peski should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.