Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of “shrinkage” estimators
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.3982/QE950
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Other versions of this item:
- Nirav Mehta, 2018. "Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators," CESifo Working Paper Series 7163, CESifo.
- Nirav Mehta, 2017. "Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators," University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP) Working Papers 201725, University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP).
- Mehta, Nirav, 2018. "Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of “Shrinkage” Estimators," EconStor Preprints 180846, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Nirav Mehta, 2017. "Targeting the Wrong Teachers? Linking Measurement with Theory to Evaluate Teacher Incentive Schemes," University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP) Working Papers 20171, University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP).
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Cited by:
- Propper, Carol & Kunz, Johannes & Staub, Kevin & Winkelmann, Rainer, 2020. "Assessing the Quality of Public Services: Does Hospital Competition Crowd Out the For-Profit Quality Gap?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15045, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael Gilraine & Jiaying Gu & Robert McMillan, 2020. "A New Method for Estimating Teacher Value-Added," NBER Working Papers 27094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Johannes S. Kunz & Carol Propper & Kevin E. Staub & Rainer Winkelmann, 2024.
"Assessing the quality of public services: For‐profits, chains, and concentration in the hospital market,"
Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(9), pages 2162-2181, September.
- Johannes S. Kunz & Carol Propper & Kevin E. Staub & Rainer Winkelmann, 2023. "Assessing the Quality of Public Services: For-profits, Chains, and Concentration in the Hospital Market," Papers 2023-01, Centre for Health Economics, Monash University.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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