IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlabec/doi10.1086-682333.html

The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability

Author

Listed:
  • Hugh Macartney

Abstract

This paper provides the first evidence that value-added education accountability schemes induce dynamic distortions. Extending earlier dynamic moral hazard models, I propose a new test for ratchet effects, showing that classroom inputs are distorted less when schools face a shorter horizon over which they can influence student performance. I then exploit grade span variation using rich educational data to credibly identify the extent of dynamic gaming and find compelling evidence of ratchet effects based on a triple-differences approach. Further analysis indicates that these effects are driven primarily by effort distortions, with teacher reallocations playing a secondary role.

Suggested Citation

  • Hugh Macartney, 2016. "The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-28.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/682333
    DOI: 10.1086/682333
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682333
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682333
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/682333?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-547.
    2. David J. Cooper, 1999. "Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 781-804, September.
    3. Robert Bifulco & Helen F. Ladd, 2006. "The Impacts of Charter Schools on Student Achievement: Evidence from North Carolina," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 50-90, January.
    4. Thomas S. Dee & Brian Jacob, 2011. "The impact of no Child Left Behind on student achievement," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 418-446, June.
    5. Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Jonah E. Rockoff, 2014. "Measuring the Impacts of Teachers I: Evaluating Bias in Teacher Value-Added Estimates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2593-2632, September.
    6. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1987. "Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 413-436.
    7. Randall Reback & Julie Berry Cullen, 2006. "Tinkering toward accolades: School gaming under a performance accountability system," Working Papers 0601, Barnard College, Department of Economics.
    8. Allen, Douglas W. & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "Searching For Ratchet Effects In Agricultural Contracts," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 1-17, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bruce S. Shearer, 2022. "Piece‐rate cuts and ratchet effects," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1371-1403, August.
    2. Tobin, Zachary, 2024. "How do public schools respond to competition? Evidence from a charter school expansion," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    3. Nirav Mehta, 2019. "Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of “shrinkage” estimators," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(4), pages 1537-1577, November.
    4. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2018. "Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 182-202.
    5. Gallier, Carlo & Sturm, Bodo, 2021. "The ratchet effect in social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 251-268.
    6. Gallier, Carlo & Sturm, Bodo, 2020. "The ratchet effect in social dilemmas," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-015, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Johannes Abeler & David Huffman & Collin Raymond, 2025. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality, and Effort Provision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(12), pages 4404-4437, December.
    8. Christine Mulhern & Isaac M. Opper, 2021. "Measuring and Summarizing the Multiple Dimensions of Teacher Effectiveness," CESifo Working Paper Series 9263, CESifo.
    9. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Withers, John A., 2019. "Dynamic regulation revisited: Signal dampening, experimentation and the ratchet effect," DICE Discussion Papers 318, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    10. Abeler, Johannes & Huffman, David B. & Raymond, Collin, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 16284, IZA Network @ LISER.
    11. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2016. "Testing for the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-Effort Work Task," IZA Discussion Papers 9981, IZA Network @ LISER.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hugh Macartney, 2014. "The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability," NBER Working Papers 19915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2016. "Testing for the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-Effort Work Task," IZA Discussion Papers 9981, IZA Network @ LISER.
    3. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2018. "Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 182-202.
    4. Gershenson, Seth & Holt, Stephen B. & Papageorge, Nicholas W., 2015. "Who Believes in Me? The Effect of Student-Teacher Demographic Match on Teacher Expectations," IZA Discussion Papers 9202, IZA Network @ LISER.
    5. Seth Gershenson, 2016. "Performance Standards and Employee Effort: Evidence From Teacher Absences," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(3), pages 615-638, June.
    6. Richardson, J.T., 2015. "Accountability incentives and academic achievement: Distributional impacts of accountability when standards are set low," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Pierre Koning & Karen Wiel, 2012. "School Responsiveness to Quality Rankings: An Empirical Analysis of Secondary Education in the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 339-355, December.
    8. Aucejo, Esteban & Romano, Teresa & Taylor, Eric S., 2019. "Does evaluation distort teacher effort and decisions? Quasi-experimental evidence from a policy of retesting students," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102689, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Sorensen, Lucy C. & Holt, Stephen B., 2021. "Sorting it Out: The Effects of Charter Expansion on Teacher and Student Composition at Traditional Public Schools," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    10. Eric A. Hanushek & Ludger Woessmann, 2011. "How much do educational outcomes matter in OECD countries? [‘Accountability and flexibility in public schools: Evidence from Boston’s charters and pilots’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 26(67), pages 427-491.
    11. Bruce S. Shearer, 2022. "Piece‐rate cuts and ratchet effects," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1371-1403, August.
    12. Burgess, Simon, 2016. "Human Capital and Education: The State of the Art in the Economics of Education," IZA Discussion Papers 9885, IZA Network @ LISER.
    13. repec:osf:socarx:y6wh4_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Figlio, David N. & Hart, Cassandra M. D. & Karbownik, Krzysztof, 2024. "Competitive Effects of Charter Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 16773, IZA Network @ LISER.
    15. David J. Deming & Sarah Cohodes & Jennifer Jennings & Christopher Jencks, 2016. "School Accountability, Postsecondary Attainment, and Earnings," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(5), pages 848-862, December.
    16. Figlio, D. & Karbownik, K. & Salvanes, K.G., 2016. "Education Research and Administrative Data," Handbook of the Economics of Education,, Elsevier.
    17. Stephen Billings & Eric J. Brunner & Stephen L. Ross, 2014. "The Housing and Educational Consequences of the School Choice Provisions of NCLB: Evidence from Charlotte, NC," Working papers 2014-21, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    18. Brian Jacob & Jens Ludwig, 2008. "Improving Educational Outcomes for Poor Children," NBER Working Papers 14550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-547.
    20. Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Verbeke, Willem, 2014. "Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-13.
    21. Brian P. Gill & Jennifer S. Lerner & Paul Meosky, "undated". "Re-Imagining Accountability in K-12 Education: A Behavioral Science Perspective," Mathematica Policy Research Reports d0c19d0709b641259fe391b2e, Mathematica Policy Research.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/682333. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.