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Searching For Ratchet Effects In Agricultural Contracts

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  • Allen, Douglas W.
  • Lueck, Dean

Abstract

In a dynamic contracting environment, increasing standards over time in light of past performance is known as the ratchet effect. Despite the recent theoretical attention given to the ratchet effect, models that include these effects have not been empirically tested against contract data. In this study, we use farm-level data on modern Great Plains agricultural cash rent and cropshare contracts to test for the presence of ratchet effects in the context of a principal-agent model with moral hazard. We find limited evidence for the ratchet effect within share contracts, and no evidence that it is important for the choice of contract between cash rent and cropshare.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Douglas W. & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "Searching For Ratchet Effects In Agricultural Contracts," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 1-17, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:30796
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30796
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hugh Macartney, 2014. "The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability," NBER Working Papers 19915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-547.
    3. Richter, Francisca G.-C. & Diaz, Edgar F. Pebe & Brorsen, B. Wade & Currier, Kevin, 2003. "Using Both Sociological and Economic Incentives to Reduce Moral Hazard," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 1-10, August.
    4. Hugh Macartney, 2016. "The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-28.
    5. He Yiming & Luo Biliang & Zou Baoling, 2018. "Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-12, June.
    6. Roe, Brian E. & Wu, Steven Y., 2003. "The Welfare Effects Of Banning Tournaments When Commitment Is Impossible: Some Results From The Broiler Sector," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22151, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2016. "Testing for the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-Effort Work Task," IZA Discussion Papers 9981, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Preckel, Paul V. & Shively, Gerald E. & Baker, Timothy G. & Chu, Mei-Chin & Burrell, Jessica Eide, 2000. "Contract Incentives And Excessive Nitrogen Use In Agriculture," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 1-17, December.
    9. Cordero Salas, Paula, 2016. "Relational Contracts and Product Quality: The Effect of Bargaining Power on Efficiency and Distribution," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 41(3), pages 1-19.
    10. Hotopp, Henning & Mußhoff, Oliver, 2012. "Can rent adjustment clauses reduce the income risk of farms?," International Journal of Agricultural Management, Institute of Agricultural Management, vol. 1(4), pages 1-10, July.
    11. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2018. "Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 182-202.

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