Can rent adjustment clauses reduce the income risk of farms?
Risk management is gaining importance in agriculture. In addition to traditional instruments, new risk management instruments are increasingly being proposed. These proposals include the rent adjustment clauses (RACs), which seem to be an unusual instrument at first sight. In contrast with conventional instruments, RACs intentionally allow fixed-cost â€˜rent paymentsâ€™ to fluctuate. We investigate the whole-farm risk reduction potential of different types of RACs via a historical simulation. The change in standard deviation and the value at risk (VaR) of the total gross margin (TGM) measure risk reduction potential. Our results revealed that RACs contribute to farm risk management. However, the trade-off between moral hazard and basis risk must be considered. Our proposal of weather index-based RAC seems to be a â€˜good compromiseâ€™: the problem of moral hazard is completely eliminated by objectively measuring weather data. At the same time, the risk reduction potential of precipitation-based clauses, for example, is comparatively high.
Volume (Year): 01 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.ijagman.org |
Web page: http://www.ifmaonline.org/Email:
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Allen, Douglas W. & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "Searching For Ratchet Effects In Agricultural Contracts," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(02), December.
- Ana I. Sanjuán & Philip J. Dawson & Lionel J. Hubbard & Sawako Shigeto, 2009. "Rents and Land Prices in Japan: A Panel Cointegration Approach," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 85(4), pages 587-597.
- Calum G. Turvey, 2005. "The pricing of degree-day weather options," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 59-85, May.
- Menale Kassie & Stein Holden, 2007. "Sharecropping efficiency in Ethiopia: threats of eviction and kinship," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 37(2-3), pages 179-188, 09.
- Ernst Berg & Bernhard Schmitz, 2008. "Weather-based instruments in the context of whole-farm risk management," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 68(1), pages 119-133, September.
- Barry K. Goodwin & Alan P. Ker, 1998. "Nonparametric Estimation of Crop Yield Distributions: Implications for Rating Group-Risk Crop Insurance Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(1), pages 139-153.
- Marc F. Bellemare, 2009. "Sharecropping, Insecure Land Rights and Land Titling Policies: A Case Study of Lac Alaotra, Madagascar," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 27(1), pages 87-106, 01.
- Keita Fukunaga & Wallace E. Huffman, 2009. "The Role of Risk and Transaction Costs in Contract Design: Evidence from Farmland Lease Contracts in U.S. Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(1), pages 237-249.
- Teresa Serra & David Zilberman & Barry K. Goodwin & Allen Featherstone, 2006. "Effects of decoupling on the mean and variability of output," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 269-288, September.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh & Pandey, Priyanka, 2000. "Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 303-326, December.
- Vedenov, Dmitry V. & Barnett, Barry J., 2004. "Efficiency of Weather Derivatives as Primary Crop Insurance Instruments," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(03), December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:ijameu:159237. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.