The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization
Download full text from publisherTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
References listed on IDEAS
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991.
"Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1989. "Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: evidence from Japanese industrial groups," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 82, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Grundfest, Joseph A., 1990. "Subordination of American capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 89-114, September.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1988. "The Determinants of Board Composition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 589-606, Winter.
- Steven Kaplan & Bernadette Minton, 1993. "'Outside' Intervention in Japanese Companies: Its Determinants and Implications for Mangers," NBER Working Papers 4276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steven N. Kaplan, 1992. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 4065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stephen D. Prowse, 1990. "Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the U.S. and Japan," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 108, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004.
"The subsidiarity bias in regulation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 255-283, January.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2000. "The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation," IDEI Working Papers 96, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & JÃ©rome Pouyet, 2000. "The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation," SERIES 0001, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Jun 2000.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and dynamic incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
- David Martimort & Salvatore Piccolo, 2010. "The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 204-229, February.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2009. "Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common-agency games," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 78-102.
- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
- Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1995.
"Intertemporal common agency and organizational design: How much decentralization?,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1405-1428, August.
- Trond Olsen & Gaute Torsvik, 1993. "Intertemporal Common Agency and Organizational Design: How much Decentralization?," CESifo Working Paper Series 37, CESifo Group Munich.
- Tangerås, Thomas P., 2012.
"Optimal transmission regulation of an integrated energy market,"
Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 1644-1655.
- Tangerås, Thomas P., 2010. "Optimal Transmission Regulation in an Integrated Energy Market," Working Paper Series 838, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009.
"Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
- Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43903, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Siqueira, Kevin Jay, 1998. "Issues of collective action: common agency, partial cooperation, and clubs," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000013526, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2016. "Testing for the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-Effort Work Task," IZA Discussion Papers 9981, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Giulio Federico, 2001. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2001-16, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
- Allen, Douglas W. & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "Searching For Ratchet Effects In Agricultural Contracts," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(02), December.
- Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
- Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, EconWPA.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 129-145, February.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:182-202 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:1:p:136-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jleo .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .