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Intertemporal Common Agency and Organizational Design: How much Decentralization?

Author

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  • Trond Olsen
  • Gaute Torsvik

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Trond Olsen & Gaute Torsvik, 1993. "Intertemporal Common Agency and Organizational Design: How much Decentralization?," CESifo Working Paper Series 37, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_37
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    Cited by:

    1. Pavan, Alessandro & Calzolari, Giacomo, 2009. "Sequential contracting with multiple principals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 503-531, March.
    2. Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and dynamic incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
    3. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2009. "Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 78-102, March.
    4. repec:isu:genstf:1998010108000013526 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ott, Ursula F., 2015. "Repeated moral hazard in international joint ventures: Inter-temporal culturally sensitive incentive schemes for hidden action," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 166-179.
    6. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    7. Gifford, Sharon, 1999. "Efficient moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 427-442, December.
    8. Humplick, Frannie & Moini-Araghi, Azadeh, 1996. "Is there an optimal structure for decentralized provision of roads?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1657, The World Bank.
    9. Carrasco, Vinicius, 2010. "Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 264-268, September.
    10. Estache, Antonio & Martimort, David, 1999. "Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2073, The World Bank.
    11. George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004. "Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 617-633, December.
    12. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
    13. Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1589-1646, December.
    14. David Bartolini, 2010. "Separation of Regulatory Powers When Contracts Are Incomplete," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 225-247, April.
    15. Meyer, Margaret A. & Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1996. "Limited intertemporal commitment and job design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 401-417, December.
    16. Burnett, Johann Caro & Carrasco, Vinicius, 2011. "Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 606-627, September.
    17. Roe, Brian E. & Wu, Steven Y., 2003. "The Welfare Effects Of Banning Tournaments When Commitment Is Impossible: Some Results From The Broiler Sector," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22151, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    18. Bickenbach, Frank, 2000. "Regulation of Europe's network industries: the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism," Kiel Working Papers 977, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    19. Olsen, Trond E & Torsvik, Gaute, 2000. "Discretion and Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 377-404, July.

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