Can Principals Identify Effective Teachers? Evidence on Subjective Performance Evaluation in Education
We examine how well principals can distinguish between more and less effective teachers. To put principal evaluations in context, we compare them with the traditional determinants of teacher compensationâ€”education and experienceâ€”as well as value-added measures of teacher effectiveness based on student achievement gains. We present â€œout-of-sampleâ€ predictions that mitigate concerns that the teacher quality and student achievement measures are determined simultaneously. We find that principals can generally identify teachers who produce the largest and smallest standardized achievement gains but have far less ability to distinguish between teachers in the middle of this distribution.
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- Daniel Aaronson & Lisa Barrow & William Sander, 2007.
"Teachers and Student Achievement in the Chicago Public High Schools,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 95-135.
- Daniel Aaronson & Lisa Barrow & William Sander, 2002. "Teachers and student achievement in the Chicago public high schools," Working Paper Series WP-02-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Ballou, Dale, 2001. "Pay for performance in public and private schools," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 51-61, February.
- Clive Bull, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 147-159. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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