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Billionaire Wealth, Firm Performance and Financial Crisis: An Empirical Analysis for India

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  • Saibal Ghosh

Abstract

Employing data for 2001–2012, the article analyzes the factors impacting the wealth of Indian billionaires and the performance and innovative activity of firms which these billionaires represent. The analysis indicates that billionaires in rent-thick sectors have higher wealth levels, on average. As well, the evidence also supports lower wealth for self-made and entrepreneurial billionaires. The findings also reveal that self-interested actions by billionaires tend to raise agency costs, which, in turn, dampens profitability and firm value. Finally, there is evidence which suggests a tendency on the part of billionaires to block innovative activity. JEL Classification: D31, N35, P52

Suggested Citation

  • Saibal Ghosh, 2016. "Billionaire Wealth, Firm Performance and Financial Crisis: An Empirical Analysis for India," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 5(2), pages 133-156, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:smppub:v:5:y:2016:i:2:p:133-156
    DOI: 10.1177/2277978716671050
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Billionaire; rent-thick; entrepreneurial capitalism; India; research and development (R&D);
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • N35 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P52 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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