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Corporate Valuation and Governance: Evidence from Colombia

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  • Luis H. Gutiérrez
  • Carlos Pombo

Abstract

This paper examines for the first time the association of different ownership and control measures and separation ratios with a firm`s value and performance for 108 non-financial firms that traded their stock during the period 1998 to 2002. Large blockholders were found to exert a positive influence upon a firm`s valuation and performance, which validates the positive monitoring approach of large shareholders, but it was also found that this relationship is not monotonic, implying that when separation of control and ownership tends to increase, a negative effect is exerted on firm`s valuation. This paper also reports the first estimates of a survey of corporate governance practices conducted in 2004 for 43 Colombian non-financial companies. The corporate governance index`s (CGI) scores suggest that implementation of good governance in Colombian firms has been slow and poor, as measured by an index average that is below half the maximum attainable value. Regrettably, it was not possible to find any support to recent theories that predict a positive association between good governance practices -as measured by the CGI - and performance. At most, there exists a positive relationship for the sub-index, but the results were not statistically significant in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis H. Gutiérrez & Carlos Pombo, 2005. "Corporate Valuation and Governance: Evidence from Colombia," Research Department Publications 3216, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3216
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Velloso, Helvia & Núñez Reyes, Georgina, 2009. "El papel de la gobernanza corporativa en la recuperación y desarrollo de los mercados de capital en Estados Unidos," Copublicaciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 2012.
    2. Mauricio A. Hernández M. & Munir A. Jalil B. & Carlos Esteban Posada P., 2007. "El Costo De Los Ciclos Económicos En Colombia: Una Nueva Estimación," ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ESPE, vol. 25(53), pages 288-335, January.
    3. Gutierrez, Luis H. & Pombo, Carlos & Taborda, Rodrigo, 2008. "Ownership and control in Colombian corporations," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, pages 22-47.
    4. Fernando Lefort, 2005. "Ownership Structure And Corporate Governance In Latin America," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 8(1), pages 55-84.
    5. Paula, Germano M. de, 2009. "Gobernanza corporativa, políticas públicas, mercado de capitales e inversiones extranjeras," Copublicaciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 2010.
    6. Clarke, Alvaro, 2009. "Buenos gobiernos corporativos para los negocios: el caso de Chile," Copublicaciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 2015.
    7. Paula, Germano M. de, 2009. "Gobernanza corporativa y mercado de capitales en Brasil," Copublicaciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 2013.
    8. Luis H. Gutiérrez & Carlos Pombo & Rodrigo Taborda, 2005. "Ownership and Control in Colombian Corporations," Research Department Publications 3220, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Pombo, Carlos & Gutiérrez, Luis H., 2009. "Mercados de capitales y gobernanza corporativa en Colombia," Copublicaciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 2016.
    10. Viscencio Brambila, Héctor, 2009. "Gobernanza corporativa: el caso de México," Copublicaciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 2017.
    11. López-de-Silanes, Florencio, 2009. "Gobierno corporativo y mercados financieros en la OCDE y América Latina: lecciones para los cambios regulatorios después de la crisis financiera," Copublicaciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 2011.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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