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One Decade of Evolution of Corporate Governance Practices in Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal

    () (The Coppead Graduate School of Business at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ))

  • André L. Carvalhal

    () (IAG, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio))

  • Ana Paula Iervolino

    () (Student in the Advanced Master Programme in Governance and Development, University of Antwerp / former Research and Content Analyst, Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC, 2012-2015))

Abstract

Este estudo apresenta a evolução de certas práticas de governança corporativa de empresas brasileiras negociadas em bolsa entre 2004 e 2013 que compõem um índice (CGI). Os resultados indicam que a qualidade dessas práticas melhorou, especialmente após a criação dos níveis diferenciados de negociação de adesão voluntária na bolsa, que exigem práticas melhores de governança corporativa e transparência. O CGI médio de 5,8 (em um total de 10) em 2013 pode ser considerado baixo e sugere que pode haver mais espaço para melhoria. Além disso, as empresas pontuam muito baixo nos aspectos de ética e conflitos de interesse do CGI, quando comparadas com os componentes sobre transparência, composição e funcionamento do conselho e diretos dos acionistas. O número muito pequeno de empresas que proíbem empréstimos a partes relacionadas e que facilitam a participação nas assembleias de acionistas é uma preocupação. A diminuição de mecanismos de aumento do controle, como as ações sem direito de voto e estruturas indiretas de controle, foi um avanço notável. Mesmo assim, os acordos de acionistas são cada vez mais empregados como instrumentos que interferem com a independência dos conselheiros e aumentam o poder do bloco controlador.

Suggested Citation

  • Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal & André L. Carvalhal & Ana Paula Iervolino, 2015. "One Decade of Evolution of Corporate Governance Practices in Brazil," Brazilian Review of Finance, Brazilian Society of Finance, vol. 13(1), pages 134-161.
  • Handle: RePEc:brf:journl:v:13:y:2015:i:1:p:134-161
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance index; conflicts of interest; board of directors; disclosure; shareholder rights; Brazil.;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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