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Conducción y valor empresarial en Brasil (y Chile)

  • Ricardo Leal
  • André Carvalhal-da-Silva
Registered author(s):

    (Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se elabora un índice de prácticas de conducción empresarial (CGI, por sus siglas en inglés) basándose en un conjunto de 24 preguntas que se pueden responder objetivamente a partir de información disponible públicamente. El objetivo es cuantificar la calidad general de las prácticas de conducción empresarial del mayor número posible de compañías. Los niveles del CGI en Brasil han venido mejorando con el tiempo, y un análisis de sus componentes indica que las compañías brasileñas tienen un desempeño mucho mejor en cuanto a la información que suministran que en cuanto a otros aspectos de la gestión empresarial. En este trabajo se hallan niveles sumamente elevados de concentración de derechos de voto, apalancados por el uso generalizado de estructuras de control indirecto y acciones sin derecho a voto. No se hallan indicios ni de afianzamiento firme ni de incentivos en cuanto al uso de porcentajes de propiedad en Brasil, pero sí se hallan indicios de que la separación del control de los derechos sobre el flujo de caja destruye el valor. El CGI mantiene una relación positiva, significativa y robusta con el valor de la empresa. Una mejora de peor a mejor en el CGI en 2002 conduciría a un aumento de 0,38 del coeficiente de Tobin, lo cual representa un aumento de 95% del valor de la acción de una compañía con apalancamiento promedio y las proporciones del coeficiente de Tobin. Tomando en cuenta nuestro coeficiente CGI más bajo, un aumento de un punto del CGI conduciría a un aumento de 6,8% del precio de la acción de la compañía promedio en 2002. No se halló relación significativa alguna entre la conducción empresarial y el pago de dividendos. Los resultados se ponen en contexto mediante un análisis comparativo con Chile.

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    Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 3209.

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    Date of creation: Oct 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3209
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