IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

La malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appels d'offres

Listed author(s):
  • Florence Naegelen

[fre] La malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appels d'offres La malédiction du vainqueur, évoquée en particulier dans le cas clé l'attribution des concessions d exploitations pétrolières, est un phénomène spécifique aux appels d'offres destinés à attribuer un bien à valeur inconnue. Elle se caractérise schématiquement par le fait que le vainqueur de l'appel d'offres est généralement l'offreur qui a le plus surestimé la valeur de l'objet offert. Cet article présente les différentes interprétations du phénomène qui ont été proposées et en tente une évaluation. L'étude est menée dans le cadre de la théorie des enchères et repose sur l'analyse des comportements clés agents impliqués dans un appel d'offres. Deux sortes d'explication sont avancées, l'une dans laquelle la valeur de l'objet pour le vainqueur est déterminée indépendamment de la procédure, et l'autre dans laquelle cette valeur est révélée par la procédure. Les raisons de l'apparition de la malédiction sont ensuite examinées. [eng] The winner's curse in auctions The winner's curse is a plienomenon which appears in sealed bid auctions for items with unknown value, and which has been especially observed in the auctions used to acquire petroleum leases. Roughly, it is characterized by the fact that the winner in an auction tends to be the one who more overestimated the item true value. In this paper, we present the different interpretations of the problem given in the literature and try to evaluate them. Bidding theory methods are used to study the problem and the analysis is based on the determination of the bidders strategies. There are two kinds of explanation of the curse : one in which the object's value is independent of the bidding procedure and the other one in which this value is revealed by the bidding procedure. The reasons of the appearance of the winner's curse are then examined.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

File URL:
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 37 (1986)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 605-636

in new window

Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_4_408931
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1986.408931
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

in new window

  1. Douglas K. Reece, 1978. "Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 369-384, Autumn.
  2. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
  3. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  4. Smith, James L, 1981. "Non-Aggressive Bidding Behavior and the "Winner's Curse."," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(3), pages 380-388, July.
  5. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  6. Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-688, May.
  7. Keith C. Brown, 1975. "A Note on Optimal Fixed-Price Bidding with Uncertain Production Cost," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 695-697, Autumn.
  8. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
  9. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_4_408931. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.