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La malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appels d'offres

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  • Florence Naegelen

Abstract

[fre] La malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appels d'offres. . La malédiction du vainqueur, évoquée en particulier dans le cas clé l'attribution des concessions d exploitations pétrolières, est un phénomène spécifique aux appels d'offres destinés à attribuer un bien à valeur inconnue. Elle se caractérise schématiquement par le fait que le vainqueur de l'appel d'offres est généralement l'offreur qui a le plus surestimé la valeur de l'objet offert. Cet article présente les différentes interprétations du phénomène qui ont été proposées et en tente une évaluation. L'étude est menée dans le cadre de la théorie des enchères et repose sur l'analyse des comportements clés agents impliqués dans un appel d'offres. Deux sortes d'explication sont avancées, l'une dans laquelle la valeur de l'objet pour le vainqueur est déterminée indépendamment de la procédure, et l'autre dans laquelle cette valeur est révélée par la procédure. Les raisons de l'apparition de la malédiction sont ensuite examinées. [eng] The winner's curse in auctions . . The winner's curse is a plienomenon which appears in sealed bid auctions for items with unknown value, and which has been especially observed in the auctions used to acquire petroleum leases. Roughly, it is characterized by the fact that the winner in an auction tends to be the one who more overestimated the item true value. In this paper, we present the different interpretations of the problem given in the literature and try to evaluate them. Bidding theory methods are used to study the problem and the analysis is based on the determination of the bidders strategies. There are two kinds of explanation of the curse : one in which the object's value is independent of the bidding procedure and the other one in which this value is revealed by the bidding procedure. The reasons of the appearance of the winner's curse are then examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Florence Naegelen, 1986. "La malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appels d'offres," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(4), pages 605-636.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_4_408931
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1986.408931
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1986.408931
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas K. Reece, 1978. "Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 369-384, Autumn.
    2. Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-688, May.
    3. M. E. Oren & A. C. Williams, 1975. "On Competitive Bidding," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 23(6), pages 1072-1079, December.
    4. Keith C. Brown, 1975. "A Note on Optimal Fixed-Price Bidding with Uncertain Production Cost," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 695-697, Autumn.
    5. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
    6. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
    7. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    8. Smith, James L, 1981. "Non-Aggressive Bidding Behavior and the "Winner's Curse."," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(3), pages 380-388, July.
    9. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    10. Lawrence Friedman, 1956. "A Competitive-Bidding Strategy," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(1), pages 104-112, February.
    11. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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