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Hiring on the Basis of Expected Productivity in a South African Clothing Firm

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  • Frijters, Paul

Abstract

Using information from the personnel files of a South African clothing firm, the author explores the in- and outflow of weekly-paid workers. These employees form a separate labor market within the company. Data was available concerning both the productivity of current workers, and the characteristics of rejected applicants and fired workers. This makes it possible to identify the characteristics which are screened out at entry and the characteristics that influence productivity. This allows for an empirical analysis of discrimination at job-entry. Hiring decisions were found to be consistent with expected productivity. The observed screening out of African workers at job entry could be explained by statistical discrimination, i.e., the actual productivity of African workers in this firm was found to be significantly lower than the productivity of workers of other ethnic backgrounds. The effect of education on productivity was found to be very small. Copyright 1999 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Frijters, Paul, 1999. "Hiring on the Basis of Expected Productivity in a South African Clothing Firm," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 345-354, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:51:y:1999:i:2:p:345-54
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    1. George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antoninis, Manos, 2006. "The wage effects from the use of personal contacts as hiring channels," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 133-146, January.
    2. Geeta Gandhi Kingdon & John Knight, 2004. "Race and the Incidence of Unemployment in South Africa," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 198-222, 05.

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