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Does central bank governors term in office matter for macroprudential policies? Evidence from MENA banks

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  • Ghosh, Saibal

Abstract

Using a comprehensive dataset on MENA banks, we examine whether CB governors use of macroprudential instruments affect bank risk. The findings indicate that the CB governors’ use of such instruments does not significantly reduce bank risk. We propose two hypotheses as to why CB governor are inclined to employ such instruments. Based on the findings, it appears that the decision to use such instruments is dictated more by macroeconomic considerations as opposed to peer pressure concerns.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghosh, Saibal, 2017. "Does central bank governors term in office matter for macroprudential policies? Evidence from MENA banks," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 34-51.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:40:y:2017:i:c:p:34-51
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.12.004
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Macroprudential; Central bank governor; Peer pressure; Entrenchment; Banking; MENA;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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