IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Is power more evenly balanced in poor households?

  • Couprie, Hélène
  • Peluso, Eugenio
  • Trannoy, Alain

The structure of intra-household allocation is crucial to know whether a transfer from a rich household to a poor one translates into a transfer from a rich individual to a poor one. If rich households are more unequal than poor ones, then a progressive transfer among households reduces intra-household inequality, hence inequality among individuals. More specifically, two conditions have to be satisfied for extending Generalized Lorenz judgments from household level to individual one. The fraction of the couple's expenditures devoted to goods jointly consumed should decrease at the margin with the couple's income as well as the part of private expenditure devoted to the disadvantaged individual. This double concavity condition is non-parametrically tested on the French Household Expenditure Survey (2000). It is not rejected by the data and supports the view that power is more evenly distributed in poor households.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(10)00009-5
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 94 (2010)
Issue (Month): 7-8 (August)
Pages: 493-507

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:7-8:p:493-507
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Richard W. Blundell & Martin Browning & Ian A. Crawford, 2003. "Nonparametric Engel Curves and Revealed Preference," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 205-240, January.
  2. François Bourguignon & Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori, 2006. "Efficient Intra-household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification," CAM Working Papers 2006-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
  3. Eugenio Peluso & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Does Less Inequality among Households Mean Less Inequality among Individuals?," IDEP Working Papers 0407, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jun 2004.
  4. Haddad, Lawrence & Kanbur, Ravi, 1989. "How serious is the neglect of intrahousehold inequality ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 296, The World Bank.
  5. Frederic Vermeulen, 2006. "A collective model for female labour supply with non-participation and taxation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(1), pages 99-118, February.
  6. Frick, Joachim R. & Grabka, Markus M., 2003. "Imputed Rent and Income Inequality: A Decomposition Analysis for Great Britain, West Germany and the U.S," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 513-537.
  7. Phipps, Shelley A & Burton, Peter S, 1998. "What's Mine Is Yours? The Influence of Male and Female Incomes on Patterns of Household Expenditure," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 599-613, November.
  8. Ellison, G. & Ellison, F., 1993. "A Simple Framework for Non-Parametric Specification Testing," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1662, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-16, CIRANO.
  10. Helene Couprie & Eugenio Peluso & Alain Trannoy, 2007. "From Household to Individual Welfare Comparisons: A Double Concavity Test," IDEP Working Papers 0701, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 01 2007.
  11. Couprie Helene & Peluso Eugenio & Trannoy Alain, 2009. "Is power more evenly balanced in poor households?," THEMA Working Papers 2009-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  12. Brennan, Geoffrey, 1981. "The Attribution of Public Goods Benefits," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 36(3), pages 347-73.
  13. Donni, Olivier, 2003. "Collective household labor supply: nonparticipation and income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1179-1198, May.
  14. Jason Abrevaya & Wei Jiang, 2005. "A Nonparametric Approach to Measuring and Testing Curvature," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 23, pages 1-19, January.
  15. Pagan,Adrian & Ullah,Aman, 1999. "Nonparametric Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521586115, Junio.
  16. Eugenio Peluso & Alain Trannoy, 2009. "Poverty orderings and intra-household inequality: The Lost Axiom," Journal of Income Distribution, Journal of Income Distribution, vol. 18(3-4), pages 24-33, September.
  17. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Arthur Lewbel, . "Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power," CAM Working Papers 2003-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics, revised Dec 2003.
  18. Shelly J. Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(3), pages 463-480.
  19. Olivier Donni, 2009. "A Simple Approach to Investigate Intrahousehold Allocation of Private and Public Goods," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(3), pages 617-628, August.
  20. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2004. "Collective and Unitary Models: a Clarification," CAM Working Papers 2004-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
  21. Hélène Couprie, 2007. "Time allocation within the Family: Welfare implications of life in a couple," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 287-305, 01.
  22. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  23. Martin Browning & Jens Bonke, 2006. "Allocation within the household: direct survey evidence," Economics Series Working Papers 286, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  24. Martin Browning & P.A. Chiappori, 1996. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations - A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 96-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  25. Shorrocks, Anthony F, 1983. "Ranking Income Distributions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(197), pages 3-17, February.
  26. Browning, Martin & Meghir, Costas, 1991. "The Effects of Male and Female Labor Supply on Commodity Demands," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 925-51, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:7-8:p:493-507. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.