IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Competing for capital when labor is heterogeneous

  • Sato, Yasuhiro
  • Thisse, Jacques-Francois

This paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting with imperfect matching between firms and workers. The small country attracts fewer firms than the large one but accommodates a share of the industry that exceeds its capital share - a reverse home market effect. This allows the small country to be more aggressive and to set a higher tax rate than the large one, thus implying that tax competition reduces international inequalities. However, the large country always attains a higher utility than does the small country. Our model thus encapsulates both the 'importance of being small' and the 'importance of being large'. Last, tax harmonization benefits to the small country but is detrimental to the large one.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014-2921(07)00006-2
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 51 (2007)
Issue (Month): 8 (November)
Pages: 2054-2079

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:8:p:2054-2079
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Keith Head & Thierry Mayer & John Ries, 2002. "On the pervasiveness of home market effects," Post-Print hal-01017590, HAL.
  2. Behrens, Kristian, 2005. "Market size and industry location: Traded vs non-traded goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 24-44, July.
  3. Andersson, Fredrik & Forslid, Rikard, 1999. "Tax Competition and Economic Geography," CEPR Discussion Papers 2220, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, 2002. "Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization," NBER Working Papers 9290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. International Monetary Fund, 2004. "Trade and Industrial Location with Heterogeneous Labor," IMF Working Papers 04/103, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November.
  7. Rainald Borck & Michael Pflüger, 2004. "Agglomeration and Tax Competition," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 408, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  8. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
  9. Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Zenou, Yves, 2000. "Skill mismatch and unemployment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 415-420, December.
  10. Andreas Haufler & Ian Wooton, "undated". "Country Size and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment," Working Papers 9702, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  11. Head, Keith & Mayer, Thierry, 2004. "The empirics of agglomeration and trade," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 59, pages 2609-2669 Elsevier.
  12. PERALTA, Susana & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, "undated". "Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1971, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. de Mooij, Ruud A & Ederveen, Sjef, 2003. "Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A Synthesis of Empirical Research," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(6), pages 673-693, November.
  14. Guy Dumais & Glenn Ellison & Edward Glaeser, 1997. "Geographic Concentration as a Dynamic Process," NBER Working Papers 6270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2005. "Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 258-274, March.
  16. Donald R. Davis & David E. Weinstein, 1998. "Market Access, Economic Geography and Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Assessment," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1850, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  17. Krugman, Paul, 1980. "Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 950-959, December.
  18. Harry Huizinga & Gaëtan Nicodème, 2003. "Foreign ownership and corporate income taxation : an empirical evaluation," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 185, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  19. Donald R. Davis & David E. Weinstein, 1997. "Economic Geography and Regional Production Structure: An Empirical Investigation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1802, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  20. CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, "undated". "Factor mobility and redistribution," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1749, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  21. Hamilton, Jonathan & Thisse, Jacques-François & Zenou, Yves, 1999. "Wage Competition with Heterogeneous Workers and Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 2141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  23. Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2005. "Market size and tax competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 25-46, September.
  24. Helsley, Robert W. & Strange, William C., 1990. "Matching and agglomeration economies in a system of cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 189-212, September.
  25. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
  26. Rosenthal, Stuart S. & Strange, William C., 2004. "Evidence on the nature and sources of agglomeration economies," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 49, pages 2119-2171 Elsevier.
  27. Masahisa Fujita & Paul Krugman & Anthony J. Venables, 2001. "The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262561476.
  28. Kim, Sunwoong, 1989. "Labor Specialization and the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 692-705, June.
  29. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Existence of Nash equilibria in fiscal competition models," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 283-296, May.
  30. Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, 2002. "Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 449-495, October.
  31. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  32. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:8:p:2054-2079. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.