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Inefficient Lock‐In And Subsidy Competition

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  • Rainald Borck
  • Hyun‐Ju Koh
  • Michael Pflüger

Abstract

This article studies a subsidy game among two asymmetric regions in a new trade model. Capital can freely move among regions, but capital rewards are repatriated to the region of residence. The activity of the modern sector is associated with positive spillovers. We study subsidy competition, starting from an equilibrium where the industry core is inefficiently locked in to the smaller region. When regions weigh workers’ and capitalists’ welfare equally, subsidy competition results in a relocation of industry to the larger region, restoring an efficient allocation. When workers’ welfare is weighted more heavily, the smaller (core) region may pay subsidies that are high enough to prevent a relocation of industry.

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  • Rainald Borck & Hyun‐Ju Koh & Michael Pflüger, 2012. "Inefficient Lock‐In And Subsidy Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1179-1204, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:53:y:2012:i:4:p:1179-1204
    DOI: j.1468-2354.2012.00716.x
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    3. Hayato Kato, 2018. "Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect," Spatial Economic Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 276-295, July.
    4. Brülhart, Marius & Bucovetsky, Sam & Schmidheiny, Kurt, 2015. "Taxes in Cities," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1123-1196, Elsevier.
    5. Yang, Yong-cong & Nie, Pu-yan & Liu, Hui-ting & Shen, Ming-hao, 2018. "On the welfare effects of subsidy game for renewable energy investment: Toward a dynamic equilibrium model," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 420-428.
    6. Hyun-Ju Koh & Ferdinand Mittermaier, 2009. "The winner gives it all: Unions, tax competition and offshoring," Working Papers 079, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    7. Augusto Cerqua & Guido Pellegrini, 2014. "Beyond the SUTVA: how policy evaluations change when we allow for interactions among firms," Working Papers 2/14, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
    8. Pflüger, Michael P., 2019. "Regionale Disparitäten und Regionalpolitik: Treiber der Veränderung, Handlungsbedarf und Handlungsoptionen," IZA Standpunkte 92, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Michael Pflüger & Stephan Russek, 2014. "Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: The Role of Country Asymmetries," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 170-188, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)

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