IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The winner gives it all: Unions, tax competition and offshoring

  • Hyun-Ju Koh
  • Ferdinand Mittermaier
Registered author(s):

    This paper analyzes competition for capital between welfare-maximizing gov- ernments in a framework with agglomeration tendencies and asymmetric union- ization. We find that a unionized country's government finds it optimal to use tax policy to induce industry to relocate towards a location with a competitive labor market instead of realizing the benefits from higher wage income while exporting part of the wage burden to foreign consumers. Via the tax regime effect, which favors the factor capital, and the efficiency effect, consumers and producers alike benefit from off-shoring industry towards a low-cost country. Our result qualifies first intuition that defending high wage industries is beneficial to a country as part of the associated cost is shifted to foreign consumers.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.bgpe.de/texte/DP/079_koh.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE) in its series Working Papers with number 079.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 29 pages
    Date of creation: Aug 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bav:wpaper:079_koh
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.bgpe.de/
    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Rodney D. Ludema & Ian Wooton, 1998. "Economic Geography and the Fiscal Effects of Regional Integration," Working Papers 9809, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    2. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2000. "Why do governments subsidise investment and not employment?," Munich Reprints in Economics 20295, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. John M. Abowd & Thomas Lemieux, 1991. "The Effects of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case of Foreign Competition in Canada," NBER Working Papers 3808, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Robin Naylor & Michele Santoni, 1999. "Foreign direct investment and wage bargaining," CSGR Working papers series 41/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
    5. Redding, Stephen & Venables, Anthony J., 2004. "Economic geography and international inequality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 53-82, January.
    6. Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2004. "Labor Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026203316x, June.
    7. Baldwin, Richard E. & Krugman, Paul, 2004. "Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-23, February.
    8. Michael Greenstone & Enrico Moretti, 2003. "Bidding for Industrial Plants: Does Winning a 'Million Dollar Plant' Increase Welfare?," NBER Working Papers 9844, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. PICARD, Pierre M. & TOULEMONDE, Eric, . "Firms agglomeration and unions," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1892, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Johannes Van Biesebroeck, 2008. "Bidding for Investment Projects: Smart Public Policy or Corporate Welfare?," Working Papers tecipa-344, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    11. Leahy, D. & Montagna, C., 1999. "Unionisation and Foreign Direct Investment: Challenging Conventional Wisdom?," Papers 99/15, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
    12. Stewart, M.B., 1989. "Union Wage Differentials, Product Market Influences And The Division Of Rents," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 323, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    13. Andreas Haufler & Ferdinand Mittermaier, 2011. "Unionisation Triggers Tax Incentives to Attract Foreign Direct Investment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(553), pages 793-818, 06.
    14. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2000. "Why do governments subsidise investment and not employment?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 171-192, October.
    15. Huizinga, Harry, 1993. " International Market Integration and Union Wage Bargaining," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(2), pages 249-55.
    16. Rainald Borck & Hyun-Ju Koh & Michael Pflüger, 2009. "Inefficient lock-in and subsidy competition," Working Papers 070, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    17. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Frode Meland & Lars Sørgard, 2002. "Unionized Oligopoly, Trade Liberalization and Location Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 777, CESifo Group Munich.
    18. Paul Krugman, 1990. "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography," NBER Working Papers 3275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-155144 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Borck, Rainald & Pflüger, Michael P., 2004. "Agglomeration and Tax Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 1033, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    21. Naylor, Robin, 1998. "International trade and economic integration when labour markets are generally unionised," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1251-1267, July.
    22. Driffill, John & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1995. " Trade Liberalization with Imperfect Competition in Goods and Labour Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(2), pages 223-43, June.
    23. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1988. "Unionized oligopoly and international trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 217-234, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bav:wpaper:079_koh. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rebecca Hartschen)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.