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Tax competition, location, and horizontal foreign direct investment

  • Kristian Behrens

    ()

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • Pierre M. Picard

    (Université catholique de Louvain; Belgium; and University of Manchester, UK)

We develop a model of capital tax/subsidy competition in which imperfectly competitive firms choose both the number and the location of the plants they operate. The endogenous presence of horizontal multinationals is shown to attenuate the “race to the bottom” and yields some results that are opposite to traditional findings in the tax competition literature. First, in the presence of horizontal multinationals, increasing subsidies decrease firms' profits by exacerbating price competition due to more firms ‘going multinational’. Second, instead of being always subsidized, capital may actually be taxed in equilibrium. Third, taxes/subsidies become strategically independent policy instruments, instead of being strategic complements. Last, there may exist multiple equilibria with either low or high subsidies.

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File URL: http://www.ifigr.org/publication/ifir_working_papers/IFIR-WP-2006-08.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in its series Working Papers with number 2006-08.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ifr:wpaper:2006-08
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