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Incentive Bidding for Mobile Investment: Economic Consequences and Potential Responses

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  • Andrew Charlton

Abstract

Competition among governments to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown significantly. This paper investigates the extent to which the size of incentive packages offered to investors by governments is driven by competitive pressure to attract mobile investment projects. It finds that such competition is in many cases a significant determinant of the size and nature of investment incentives. Competition can have both positive and negative effects on domestic and international welfare. Negative outcomes typically occur when governments offer attraction packages that are larger than the value of the benefits to the host economy, or when governments resort to inefficient incentive instruments. Increased transparency would significantly reduce the scope for negative welfare outcomes. Proper accounting for incentives helps to ensure that expenditure is aligned with policy goals, reduces the potential for corruption and improves the efficiency of the negotiation process ... La concurrence que se font les pouvoirs publics pour attirer les investissements directs étrangers (IDE) s’est nettement intensifiée. Ce Document évalue dans quelle mesure l’ampleur des faveurs accordées aux investisseurs par les pouvoirs publics dépend des pressions concurrentielles exercées pour attirer des projets d’investissement mobiles. Il en ressort que, dans bien des cas, cette concurrence détermine largement la nature et l’étendue des avantages consentis. La concurrence peut avoir des effets à la fois positifs et négatifs sur le bien-être au niveau national et international. Les effets négatifs se manifestent lorsque les pouvoirs publics concèdent à l’investisseur des avantages supérieurs aux bénéfices reçus par l’économie hôte, ou lorsqu’ils ont recours à des incitations inefficientes. Ces résultats négatifs sur le bien-être seraient grandement réduits par des mesures visant à améliorer la transparence. Une comptabilité adéquate des incitations contribuerait à garantir ...

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Charlton, 2003. "Incentive Bidding for Mobile Investment: Economic Consequences and Potential Responses," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 203, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:devaaa:203-en
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/864178271805
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    Cited by:

    1. Albornoz, Facundo & Corcos, Gregory & Kendall, Toby, 2009. "Subsidy competition and the mode of FDI," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 489-501, July.
    2. BEHRENS, Kristian & PICARD, Pierre M., 2005. "Tax competition, location, and horizontal foreign direct investment," CORE Discussion Papers 2005091, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Facundo Albornoz, Gregory Corcos and Toby Kendall, 2005. "Subsidy Competition and the Mode of FDI: Acquisition vs Greenfield," Discussion Papers 05-15, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    4. Gaigné, Carl & Wooton, Ian, 2011. "The gains from preferential tax regimes reconsidered," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, pages 59-66.
    5. Céline Azémar & Rodolphe Desbordes, 2010. "Short-run Strategies for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, pages 928-957.
    6. Hemmer, Hans-Rimbert & Krüger, Ralf & Seith, Jennifer, 2006. "Ausländische Direktinvestitionen: Flankierende Maßnahmen des Staates," Discussion Papers in Development Economics 36, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Institute for Development Economics.
    7. Harding, Torfinn & Javorcik, Beata, 2007. "Developing Economies and International Investors: Do Investment Promotion Agencies Bring Them Together?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. repec:wbk:wbpubs:28010 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Eckel, Carsten, 2006. "Policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1891-1907, October.
    10. Havranek, Tomas, 2008. "The Supply of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives: Subsidy Competition in an Oligopolistic Framework," MPRA Paper 10770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Tomáš Havránek, 2009. "The supply of foreign direct investment incentives: subsidy competition in an oligopolistic framework," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, pages 131-155.
    12. Dalila NICET- CHENAF (GREThA-GRES) & Eric ROUGIER (GREThA-GRES), 2008. "Recent exports matter: export discoveries, FDI and Growth, an empirical assessment for MENA countries," Cahiers du GRES (2002-2009) 2008-17, Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales.

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