IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v175y2025ics0304387824001779.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Meritocracy in a bureaucracy

Author

Listed:
  • Aman-Rana, Shan

Abstract

This paper examines the Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS), a bureaucracy in a high-corruption, low-transparency environment, to assess whether discretion in promotion decisions allows for the use of private information on bureaucrats’ abilities. Using unique data on junior bureaucrats’ abilities and their social ties with senior officials, the study finds evidence of meritocratic promotions: senior officials are more likely to promote high-ability juniors over those with social ties, despite limited explicit incentives. I also provide evidence indicating the circumstances under which meritocratic promotions are more likely to take place. These findings suggest that discretion can lead to improved outcomes, even in settings marked by pervasive corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Aman-Rana, Shan, 2025. "Meritocracy in a bureaucracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:175:y:2025:i:c:s0304387824001779
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103428
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387824001779
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103428?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Promotions; Discretion; Delegation; Rules; Weberian Bureaucracy; Meritocracy; Networks; Civil service; PAS; Punjab; Pakistan;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:175:y:2025:i:c:s0304387824001779. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.