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Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act

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  • Diana Moreira
  • Santiago Pérez

Abstract

Competitive exams are a standard method for selecting civil servants. Yet, there is limited evidence on their effectiveness. We digitize personnel and financial data to study the impacts of the 1883 Pendleton Act, which mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the act improved targeted employees’ professional background and reduced turnover, it did not increase cost-effectiveness in customs revenue collection. Moreover, it incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts’ hierarchical structures. These results illustrate how, by triggering countervailing organizational responses, policies that succeed at improving specific organizational aspects might nevertheless fail to improve overall performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Diana Moreira & Santiago Pérez, 2021. "Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act," NBER Working Papers 28665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28665
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    Cited by:

    1. Diana Moreira & Santiago Pérez, 2022. "Who Benefits from Meritocracy?," NBER Working Papers 30113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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