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Rescuing state capacity: Proceduralism, the new politicization, and public policy

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  • Donald P. Moynihan

Abstract

The administrative capacity of a government matters enormously to public policy design and implementation. But it is usually taken for granted in public policy settings, a background variable left largely unconsidered. This essay argues that the fields of public policy and public management need to more directly consider threats to state capacity. A creeping threat is a tendency towards proceduralism that layers in rules, veto points, and delay that constrains state actors from achieving critical goals. A more immediate threat for the American administrative state is a dramatic increase in the politicization of public service delivery. This new model of politicization pursued by President Trump features three key attributes: 1) a personalist infrastructure of presidential power that centers on loyalty above all other values; 2) governing by fear via conspiratorial messaging towards the public sector and threatening individual public servants; and 3) a weakening of civil service protections that blurs the traditional distinction between political appointees and civil servants and enables purges of those deemed to be disloyal.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald P. Moynihan, 2025. "Rescuing state capacity: Proceduralism, the new politicization, and public policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(2), pages 364-378, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:44:y:2025:i:2:p:364-378
    DOI: 10.1002/pam.22673
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    References listed on IDEAS

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