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Lost in Transition? The Persistence of Dictatorship Mayors

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  • González, F
  • Muñoz, P
  • Prem, M

Abstract

Dictatorships can affect the functioning of new democracies but the mechanisms are poorly understood. We study the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile using new data and provide two findings. First, mayors appointed by Pinochet obtained a nine percentage point vote premium in the first local election in democracy. This premium is explained by an incumbency advantage and by an increase in local spending during the transition. Second, dictatorship mayors increased the vote share of right-wing political parties in democracy. We conclude that the dictatorship won “hearts and minds” before the transition and successfully maintained part of their political power.

Suggested Citation

  • González, F & Muñoz, P & Prem, M, 2019. "Lost in Transition? The Persistence of Dictatorship Mayors," Documentos de Trabajo 17431, Universidad del Rosario.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:017431
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    2. Bautista, María Angélica & Gonzalez, Felipe & Martinez, Luis R. & Muñoz, Pablo & Prem, Mounu, 2022. "The Intergenerational Transmission of College: Evidence from the 1973 Coup in Chile," SocArXiv eyw2a, Center for Open Science.
    3. María Angelica Bautista & Felipe González & Luis R. Martínez & Pablo Munoz & Mounu Prem, 2018. "The Geography of Repression and Support for Democracy: Evidence from the Pinochet Dictatorship," Documentos de Trabajo 17007, Universidad del Rosario.
    4. Bautista, María Angélica & González, Felipe & Martínez, Luis R. & Muñoz, Pablo & Prem, Mounu, 2023. "The intergenerational transmission of higher education: Evidence from the 1973 coup in Chile," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    5. Remo Nitschke & Felix Roesel, 2023. "Elite Persistence and Policy Persistence: Re-Installed Mayors from Weimar Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 10251, CESifo.
    6. Einstoss Sebastian, 2023. "Todo está guardado en la memoria: el efecto de la violencia de estado en Argentina (Versión preliminar)," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4648, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    7. Shuichiro Nishioka & Sumi Sharma & Tuan Le, 2023. "Political Regimes and Firms' Decisions to Pay Bribes: Theory and Evidence from Firm-level Surveys," Working Papers 23-04, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    politicians; dictatorship; democracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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