IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/econom/v90y2023i359p746-779.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The importance of political selection for bureaucratic effectiveness

Author

Listed:
  • James Habyarimana
  • Stuti Khemani
  • Thiago Scot

Abstract

Bureaucratic effectiveness has come to the fore in research as necessary for economic growth and development. This paper contributes empirical evidence to understand the building blocks of bureaucracy by gathering rich survey data in a typical institutional environment of the developing world. The data reveal a robust correlation between the selection of local politicians and bureaucratic effectiveness. In districts in Uganda where locally elected politicians have higher survey‐based measures of integrity (or honesty), the bureaucracy is more effective in delivering public heath services. This evidence supports current research, and encourages future research on how the selection of political agents into government is an important determinant of bureaucratic effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • James Habyarimana & Stuti Khemani & Thiago Scot, 2023. "The importance of political selection for bureaucratic effectiveness," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(359), pages 746-779, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:90:y:2023:i:359:p:746-779
    DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12470
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12470
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ecca.12470?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Caterina Gennaioli & Stefania Lovo, 2019. "Public Goods and Ethnic Diversity: Evidence from Deforestation in Indonesia," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 86(341), pages 32-66, January.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
    3. Rachid Laaja & Karen Macours, 2021. "Measuring Skills in Developing Countries," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(4), pages 1254-1295.
    4. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    5. Francois, Patrick, 2000. "'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 275-299, November.
    6. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332.
    7. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2014. "The Causes and Consequences of Development Clusters: State Capacity, Peace, and Income," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 927-949, August.
    8. Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2007. "Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1351-1408.
    9. Keefer, Philip & Khemani, Stuti, 2014. "Mass media and public education: The effects of access to community radio in Benin," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 57-72.
    10. Philip Keefer & Stuti Khemani, 2016. "The Government Response to Informed Citizens: New Evidence on Media Access and the Distribution of Public Health Benefits in Africa," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 30(2), pages 233-267.
    11. Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Martín A. Rossi, 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(3), pages 1169-1218.
    12. Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2018. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(608), pages 413-446, February.
    13. Lee Cronbach, 1951. "Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests," Psychometrika, Springer;The Psychometric Society, vol. 16(3), pages 297-334, September.
    14. B. Douglas Bernheim & Navin Kartik, 2014. "Candidates, Character, and Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 205-246, May.
    15. Farzana Afridi & Vegard Iversen & M. R. Sharan, 2017. "Women Political Leaders, Corruption, and Learning: Evidence from a Large Public Program in India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(1), pages 1-30.
    16. Ali Hasanain & Saad Gulzar & Arman Rezaee & Yasir Khan, 2015. "Personalities and Public Sector Performance: Evidence from a Health Experiment in Pakistan," Working Papers id:6690, eSocialSciences.
    17. Frederico Finan & Maurizio Mazzocco, 2021. "Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(5), pages 2467-2512.
    18. Friedman, Jerome H. & Hastie, Trevor & Tibshirani, Rob, 2010. "Regularization Paths for Generalized Linear Models via Coordinate Descent," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 33(i01).
    19. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 2008. "Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 426-447, April.
    20. Susan Athey & Guido W. Imbens, 2019. "Machine Learning Methods That Economists Should Know About," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 685-725, August.
    21. Grossman, Guy & Lewis, Janet I., 2014. "Administrative Unit Proliferation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 196-217, February.
    22. Frederico Finan & Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, 2015. "The Personnel Economics of the State," NBER Working Papers 21825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Khemani, Stuti, 2015. "Buying votes versus supplying public services: Political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 84-93.
    24. Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1409-1443, September.
    25. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
    26. Raffler, Pia J., 2022. "Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability? Field Experimental Evidence from a Dominant Party Regime," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1443-1459, November.
    27. Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2018. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(608), pages 413-446, February.
    28. Jeffrey Weaver, 2021. "Jobs for Sale: Corruption and Misallocation in Hiring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3093-3122, October.
    29. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    30. Michael Carlos Best & Jonas Hjort & David Szakonyi, 2023. "Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(8), pages 2121-2167, August.
    31. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    32. Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio, 2009. "Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?," Chapters, in: Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio (ed.), Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    33. Adnan Khan & Guo Xu & Robin Burgess & Timothy Besley, 2022. "Bureaucracy and Development," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 397-424, August.
    34. Avinash Dixit, 2002. "# Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 696-727.
    35. Chris Bidner & Patrick Francois, 2013. "The Emergence of Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(3), pages 1397-1448.
    36. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2015. "History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(2), pages 423-456.
    37. Grossman, Guy & Michelitch, Kristin, 2018. "Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 280-301, May.
    38. Atif Mian, 2008. "Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 273-306, October.
    39. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2028, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    40. Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Olle Folke & Torsten Persson & Johanna Rickne, 2017. "Who Becomes A Politician?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 132(4), pages 1877-1914.
    41. Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer & Julien Labonne, 2021. "Buying Informed Voters: New Effects of Information on Voters and Candidates," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(635), pages 1105-1134.
    42. John Akin & Paul Hutchinson & Koleman Strumpf, 2005. "Decentralisation and government provision of public goods: The public health sector in Uganda," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(8), pages 1417-1443.
    43. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
    44. Athey, Susan & Imbens, Guido W., 2019. "Machine Learning Methods Economists Should Know About," Research Papers 3776, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    45. Sam Asher & Paul Novosad, 2017. "Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 229-273, January.
    46. Alberto Abadie & Kasy, Maximilian, 2017. "The risk of machine learning," Working Paper 383316, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    47. Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2004. "Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 679-705.
    48. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
    49. Khemani,Stuti, 2019. "What Is State Capacity ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8734, The World Bank.
    50. Katherine Donato & Grant Miller & Manoj Mohanan & Yulya Truskinovsky & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2017. "Personality Traits and Performance Contracts: Evidence from a Field Experiment among Maternity Care Providers in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 506-510, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Catalina Tejada & Eliana Ferrara & Henrik Kleven & Florian Blum & Oriana Bandiera & Michel Azulai, 2015. "State Effectiveness, Growth, and Development," Working Papers id:6668, eSocialSciences.
    2. Elliott Ash & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2015. "Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4).
    3. Abhijit Banerjee & Esther Duflo & Clément Imbert & Santhosh Mathew & Rohini Pande, 2020. "E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 39-72, October.
    4. Ash, Elliott & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2021. "Reducing partisanship in judicial elections can improve judge quality: Evidence from U.S. state supreme courts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    5. Valasek, Justin, 2018. "Dynamic reform of public institutions: A model of motivated agents and collective reputation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 94-108.
    6. Frederico Finan & Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, 2015. "The Personnel Economics of the State," NBER Working Papers 21825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Khemani,Stuti & Chaudhary,Sarang & Scot,Thiago, 2020. "Strengthening Public Health Systems : Policy Ideas from a Governance Perspective," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9220, The World Bank.
    8. Janne Tukiainen & Sebastian Blesse & Albrecht Bohne & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Jan Jäässkeläinen & Ari Luukinen & Antti Sieppi, 2021. "What Are the Priorities of Bureaucrats? Evidence from Conjoint Experiments with Procurement Officials," EconPol Working Paper 63, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    9. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    10. Pranab Bardhan, 2016. "State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 862-892, September.
    11. Kalaj, Jozefina & Rogger, Daniel & Somani, Ravi, 2022. "Bureaucrat time-use: Evidence from a survey experiment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    12. Amodio, Francesco & Choi, Jieun & De Giorgi, Giacomo & Rahman, Aminur, 2022. "Bribes vs. taxes: Market structure and incentives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 435-453.
    13. Renfu Luo & Grant Miller & Scott Rozelle & Sean Sylvia & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2015. "Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOs? School Administrator Incentives for Anemia Reduction in Rural China," NBER Working Papers 21302, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Aisha J Ali & Javier Fuenzalida & Margarita Gómez & Martin J Williams, 2021. "Four lenses on people management in the public sector: an evidence review and synthesis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 335-366.
    15. Katherine Casey & Rachel Glennerster & Edward Miguel & Maarten Voors, 2023. "Skill Versus Voice in Local Development," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 311-326, March.
    16. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Sonia Bhalotra & Brian Min & Yogesh Uppal, 2018. "Women legislators and economic performance," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-47, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    17. Erica Bosio & Simeon Djankov & Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2022. "Public Procurement in Law and Practice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(4), pages 1091-1117, April.
    18. Tinghua Yu, 2021. "Intrinsic Motivation, Office Incentives, and Innovation," BCAM Working Papers 2106, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    19. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2017. "Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    20. Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Antonio Nicolò & Kunal Sen, 2018. "Politicians and Their Promises in an Uncertain World: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in India," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1806, Economics, The University of Manchester.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:90:y:2023:i:359:p:746-779. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.