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Skill Versus Voice in Local Development

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  • Casey, Katherine
  • Glennerster, Rachel
  • Miguel, Edward
  • Voors, Maarten

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  • Casey, Katherine & Glennerster, Rachel & Miguel, Edward & Voors, Maarten, 2018. "Skill Versus Voice in Local Development," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt08k9b40r, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt08k9b40r
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
    2. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Tristan Reed & James A. Robinson, 2014. "Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(2), pages 319-368.
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