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Assignment of provincial officials based on economic performance: Evidence from China

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  • Wu, Mingqin
  • Chen, Bin

Abstract

In China, the allocation of provincial officials reflects the tradeoff of the central authority between the economic growth and regional disparity. Before the early 2000s, the pattern of assignment is close to positive assortative matching between the official's ability and the local provincial endowment, which implies that the central authority's purpose is to maximize the aggregate outputs across provinces, and after the early 2000s, the pattern of assignment converges to negative assortative matching, which is well justified by the central authority's objective of minimizing the regional disparity. This paper contributes to the literatures by exploring the cadre management on the horizontal level.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Mingqin & Chen, Bin, 2016. "Assignment of provincial officials based on economic performance: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 60-75.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:38:y:2016:i:c:p:60-75
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2015.11.009
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    1. repec:eee:eneeco:v:68:y:2017:i:c:p:31-43 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:gam:jsusta:v:9:y:2017:i:11:p:1941-:d:116567 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Assignment; Complementarity; China;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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