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Content
November 1995, Volume 11, Issue 2
- 237-253 Evolutionary Game Theory with Two Groups of Individuals
by Cressman R. - 254-278 Bayesian Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games
by Eichberger Jurgen - 279-303 Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation
by Gaunersdorfer Andrea & Hofbauer Josef - 304-329 Learning by Forgetful Players
by Hurkens Sjaak - 330-363 Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations
by Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton - 364-390 Invasion Dynamics of the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
by Nowak Martin A. & Sigmund Karl - 391-412 Expectations, Drift, and Volatility in Evolutionary Games
by Vega-Redondo Fernando
October 1995, Volume 11, Issue 1
- 1-35 Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution
by Binmore Kenneth G. & Samuelson Larry & Vaughan Richard - 36-63 Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play
by Brandts Jordi & Macleod W. Bentley - 64-89 Fictitious Play by Cases
by LiCalzi Marco
August 1995, Volume 10, Issue 2
- 255-283 Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement
by Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R. - 284-317 Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play
by Ferreira J. -L. & Gilboa I. & Maschler M. - 318-332 A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information
by Harsanyi John C. - 333-354 How to Select a Dual Nash Equilibrium
by Jehiel P. & Walliser B. - 355-367 A Transfer Property of Equilibrium Payoffs in Economies with Land
by Legut Jerzy & Potters Jos A. M. & Tijs Stef H.
July 1995, Volume 10, Issue 1
- 1-5 Introduction
by Ledyard John O. & Palfrey Thomas R. - 6-38 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
by McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R. - 39-64 Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents
by Andreoni James & Miller John H. - 65-94 Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments
by Knez Marc J. & Camerer Colin F. - 95-121 Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
by Bolton Gary E. & Zwick Rami - 122-142 Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
by Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin - 143-170 Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game
by Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Walters Mary F. - 171-201 Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of Equilibrium Solutions
by Budescu David V. & Rapoport Amnon & Suleiman Ramzi - 202-217 Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study
by Ochs Jack - 218-254 On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
by Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W.
May 1995, Volume 9, Issue 2
- 127-138 Virtual Implementation in Separable Bayesian Environments Using Simple Mechanisms
by Arya Anil & Glover Jonathan & Young Richard - 139-150 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Based upon Expected Utility and Quadratic Utility
by Cheng Leonard K. & Zhu Min - 151-160 Lower Hemicontinuity of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence
by Engl Greg - 161-171 Stochastic Common Learning
by Monderer Dov & Samet Dov - 172-190 Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences
by Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef - 191-204 Games of Fair Division
by Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William - 205-221 Bargained-Correlated Equilibria
by Tedeschi Piero - 222-233 On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding
by Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi - 234-237 Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample
by Amir Rabah - 238-246 A Note on the Probability of k Pure Nash Equilibria in Matrix Games
by Stanford William - 247-250 Rationality and Coordination, Cristina Bicchieri, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Part of a series called Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Edited by Brian Skyrms. 270 pp. plus preface, ISBN 0-521-38123-1
by Bicchieri C.
April 1995, Volume 9, Issue 1
- 1-7 Unlearning by Not Doing: Repeated Games with Vanishing Actions
by Joosten Reinoud & Peters Hans & Thuijsman Frank - 8-20 Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games
by Jordan J. S. - 21-34 Order Independent Equilibria
by Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal - 35-65 Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection
by Myerson Roger B. - 66-78 Competitively Sustainable Matching Plans with Discounting
by Green Gordon R. - 79-109 Social Norms and Random Matching Games
by Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew - 110-115 Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games
by Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher - 116-123 A Note on Repeated Extensive Games
by Sorin Sylvain
1995, Volume 8, Issue 2
- 271-280 Commitment and observability in games
by Bagwell, Kyle - 281-296 Protective behavior in matching models
by Barberà, S. & Dutta, B. - 297-321 On the dominance solvability of large cournot games
by Börgers, Tilman & Janssen, Maarten C.W. - 322-348 Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - 349-363 Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
by Ermolov, Andrew N. - 364-377 Cooperation in a one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma
by Harrington, Joseph Jr. - 378-388 Two examples of strategic equilibrium
by Mertens, J.-F. - 389-405 On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
by Nowak, A.S. & Radzik, T. - 406-423 "Impossibility of speculation" theorems with noisy information
by Sonsino, Doron - 424-432 A note on non-essential players in multi-choice cooperative games
by Hsiao, Chih-Ru
1995, Volume 8, Issue 1
- 1-2 Editor's note
by Kalai, Ehud - 3-5 Nobel symposium on game theory: Rationality and equilibrium in strategic interaction
by Skyrms, Brian - 6-19 Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
by Aumann, Robert J. - 20-55 Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. - 56-90 Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
by Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry - 91-122 A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
by Harsanyi, John C. - 123-163 Subjective games and equilibria
by Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud - 164-212 Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
by Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido - 213-263 An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
by Selten, Reinhard - 264-268 The 50th anniversary of TGEB
by Lucas, William F.
November 1994, Volume 7, Issue 3
- 309-317 The Value of Large Extensive Form Games
by Cremer Jacques - 318-331 Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions
by Gale Ian L. & Hausch Donald B. - 332-345 Learning, Tracing, and Risk Dominance
by Hendon Ebbe & Jacobsen Hans Jorgen & Nielsen Michael Teit & Sloth Birgitte - 346-380 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
by Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon - 381-389 Computable Strategies for Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
by Knoblauch Vicki - 390-405 Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games
by Lehrer Ehud - 406-427 Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games
by Leininger Wolfgang & Yang Chun-Lei - 428-440 Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games
by Perez-Castrillo J. David - 441-460 Ratio-Lindahl and Ratio Equilibria with Many Goods
by Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi - 461-472 On the Interpretation of Nonsymmetric Bargaining Solutions and Their Extension to Nonexpected Utility Preferences
by Valenciano Federico & Zarzuelo Jose M. - 473-475 Set-Valued Analysis, Systems & Control Series, Vol. 2. By Jean-Paul Aubin and Helene Frankowska, Birkhauser, Boston, 1990
by Nowakowska-Rozploch Danuta
September 1994, Volume 7, Issue 2
- 139-153 Option Values and Bargaining Delays
by Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B. - 154-168 Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining
by Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B. - 169-176 Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship
by Holden Steinar - 177-192 A Condition for the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Games with Public and Private Objectives
by Kukushkin Nikolai S. - 193-220 Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions
by Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter - 221-232 Zero-Sum Average Payoff Stochastic Games with General State Space
by Nowak Andrzej S. - 233-245 An Informationally Robust Equilibrium for Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games
by Robson~ Arthur J. - 246-259 Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs
by Shalev Jonathan - 260-285 Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Perturbations
by Watson Joel - 286-294 Equilibrium in Non-partitioning Strategies
by Weber R. J. - 295-300 The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice
by Zhou Lin - 301-307 Sharkey's Example
by Telser Lester C.
July 1994, Volume 7, Issue 1
- 1-9 Group Rationality, Utilitarianism, and Escher's Waterfall
by Basu Kaushik - 10-34 Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation
by Boylan Richard T. - 35-38 A Study on Decomposable Convex Games
by Chang Chih & Kan Ching-Yu - 39-53 Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games
by Davis Douglas D. & Holt Charles A. - 54-61 A Simple Noncooperative Core Story
by Lagunoff Roger D. - 62-91 Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game
by Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry - 92-103 Some Refinements of Nash Equilibria of Large Games
by Rath Kali P. - 104-115 Understanding When Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen
by Spiegel Matthew & Currie Janet & Sonnenschein Hugo & Sen Arunava - 116-138 Organizations as Teams of Automata
by Turnbull Stephen J.
May 1994, Volume 6, Issue 3
- 339-346 Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders
by Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard - 347-369 Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
by Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin - 370-399 Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games
by Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David - 400-415 On Strictly Perfect Sets
by Jansen M. J. M. & Jurg A. P. & Borm P. E. M. - 416-430 Economies with Land--A Game Theoretical Approach
by Legut J. & Potters J. A. M. & Tijs S. H. - 431-444 The Inner Core of an n-Person Game
by Qin Cheng-Zhong - 445-468 A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects
by Schotter Andrew & Weigelt Keith & Wilson Charles - 469-473 A Note on Strongly Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria
by Schultz Christian - 474-501 Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms
by Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay - 502-511 Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games
by Sjostrom Tomas - 512-526 A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation
by Zhou Lin
March 1994, Volume 6, Issue 2
- 181-211 Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games
by Blume Andreas - 212-219 Extensive Coverings and Exact Core Bounds
by Bondareva O. N. & Driessen T. S. H. - 220-237 Strongly Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring and Discounting
by Cronshaw Mark B. & Luenberger David G. - 238-261 Posterior Efficiency
by Forges Francoise - 262-282 Low Discounting and the Upper Long-Run Average Value in Dynamic Programming
by Lehrer Ehud & Monderer Dov - 283-298 On Nash Equilibrium
by McClendon J. F. - 299-311 Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability
by Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher - 312-327 Entry Deterrence and Limit Pricing under Asymmetric Information about Common Costs
by Salonen Hannu - 328-332 Prominence, Symmetry, or Other?
by Shubik M.
January 1994, Volume 6, Issue 1
- 1-31 An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games
by Banks Jeffrey & Camerer Colin & Porter David - 32-54 Game Theory and Literature
by Brams Steven J. - 55-82 Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies
by Friedman James W. & Samuelson Larry - 83-96 An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions
by Friedman James W. & Samuelson Larry - 97-113 Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming
by Lehrer Ehud & Monderer Dov - 114-129 A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality
by Lipman Barton L. - 130-149 Stochastic Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games
by Monahan George E. & Sobel Matthew J. - 150-161 The Shapley Value for n-Person Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form
by Nowak Andrzej S. & Radzik Tadeusz - 162-177 Internally Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior with Low Discounting
by Ray Debraj
October 1993, Volume 5, Issue 4
- 509-513 Adaptive Dynamics, Part II
by Crawford Vincent P. - 514-531 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
by Farrell Joseph - 532-546 Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability
by Warneryd Karl - 547-575 Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication
by Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel - 576-603 On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment
by Ben-Porath Elchanan & Dekel Eddie & Rustichini Aldo - 604-617 Evolution of Smartn Players
by Stahl Dale O. - 618-631 Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example
by Vega-Redondo Fernando - 632-646 Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability
by Evans George W. & Guesnerie Roger - 647-651 The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, By Brian Skyrms, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 199 pp., $32.50
by Bicchieri Cristina
July 1993, Volume 5, Issue 3
- 320-367 Learning Mixed Equilibria
by Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M. - 368-386 Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
by Jordan J. S. - 387-424 The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
by Blume Lawrence E. - 425-454 An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction
by Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry - 455-484 Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games
by Swinkels Jeroen M. - 485-504 Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication
by Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O.
April 1993, Volume 5, Issue 2
- 205-222 Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments
by Boylan Richard T. & El-Gamal Mahmoud A. - 223-226 An Example on Quasi-Zero-Monotonic Games
by Chang Chih & Hsiaq Fu-Chao - 227-239 Optimal Auctions Revisited
by Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard - 240-256 Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I
by Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S. - 257-267 On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition
by Muto Shigeo - 268-287 Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence
by Pitchik Carolyn - 288-306 Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis
by Safra Zvi & Zilcha Itzhak - 307-310 Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 2nd, Revised and Enlarged Edition, By Eric van Damme, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1991
by Cho In-Koo
January 1993, Volume 5, Issue 1
- 1-2 Game-Theoretic Models of Politics
by Banks Jeffrey S. & Myerson Roger B. - 3-43 Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule
by Austen-Smith David - 44-70 A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight
by Cameron Charles M. & Rosendorff B. Peter - 71-97 The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises
by Harrington Jr. , Joseph E. - 98-117 Information Revelation in Repeated Delegation
by Legros Patrick - 118-132 Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
by Myerson Roger B. - 133-151 Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition
by Osborne Martin J. - 152-169 The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games
by Sloth Birgitte - 170-181 Weighted Voting, Multicameral Representation, and Power
by Taylor Alan & Zwicker William - 182-201 The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game
by Laffond G. & Laslier J. F. & Le Breton M.
October 1992, Volume 4, Issue 4
- 493-510 It takes two to tango: Equilibria in a model of sales
by Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G. - 511-527 Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers
by Kaneko, Mamoru & Kimura, Toshiyuki - 528-552 The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
by Koller, Daphne & Megiddo, Nimrod - 553-564 The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria
by Mertens, Jean-Francois - 565-581 Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
by Moldovanu, Benny - 582-587 The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value
by Owen, Guillermo & Winter, Eyal - 588-605 The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmuller, Joachim - 606-626 Credible assignments in coordination games
by Van Huyck, John B. & Gillette, Ann B. & Battalio, Raymond C. - 627-649 Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule
by von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
July 1992, Volume 4, Issue 3
- 327-346 Simultaneous signaling through investment in an R& D game with private information
by Aoki, Reiko & Reitman, David - 347-372 A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Calvert, Randall L. - 373-401 Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem
by Moulin, Herve - 402-421 Coalition formation under limited communication
by Rosenthal, Edward C. - 422-425 Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
by Seidmann, Daniel J. - 426-449 Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
by Smith, Lones - 450-462 On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
by Weibull, Jorgen W. - 463-483 Continuous implementation in economics with incomplete information
by Wettstein, David - 484-492 On nash implementation of social choice correspondences
by Yamato, Takehiko
April 1992, Volume 4, Issue 2
- 169-181 A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining
by Asheim, Geir B. - 182-201 Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
by Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie & Geanakoplos, John - 202-217 The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games
by Jordan, J. S. - 218-231 Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
by Kolpin, Van - 232-251 Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers
by Peleg, B. & Shmida, A. - 252-260 Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
by Peters, Hans - 261-283 Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis
by Rapoport, Amnon & Boebel, Richard B. - 284-313 Dominated strategies and common knowledge
by Samuelson, Larry - 314-317 Game theory : By Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 608 pp., $35.00
by Wilson, Charles A.
January 1992, Volume 4, Issue 1
- 1-17 On being honest and behaving honestly
by Adler, Moshe - 18-36 Imperfect equilibrium
by Beja, Avraham - 37-57 Risk sharing with competition
by Biglaiser, Gary - 58-71 Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game
by Borm, P. E. M. & Tijs, S. H. - 72-100 Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games
by DeMarzo, Peter M. - 101-121 The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games
by Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip - 122-131 On platers with a bounded number of states
by Papadimitriou, Christos H. - 132-144 The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
by Winter, Eyal - 145-160 The hybrid solutions of an N-person game
by Zhao, Jingang - 161-165 Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis : By Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 265 + xiii pp., $54.50 (hardback)
by Rothblum, Uriel G.
November 1991, Volume 3, Issue 4
- 393-402 Uniqueness of equilibrium for smooth multistage concave games
by Brown, Murray & Chiang, Shin-Hwan & Yamamoto, Kenji - 403-422 Constrained egalitarian allocations
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj - 423-437 Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility
by Fershtman, Chaim & Safra, Zvi & Vincent, Daniel