Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Davis Douglas D.
  • Holt Charles A.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45NJVYP-10/2/2a93b82c447cca57775e2f517eac4ce5
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 7 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 39-53

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:39-53

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bart Wilson & Arthur Zillante, 2010. "More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 1-16, February.
  2. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Working Papers 0605, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  3. Brandts, Jordi & Riedl, Arno & van Winden, Frans, 2009. "Competitive rivalry, social disposition, and subjective well-being: An experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1158-1167, December.
  4. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2011. "Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00614472, HAL.
  5. Brandts,Jordi & Riedl,Arno & Winden,Frans,van, 2005. "Competition and Well-Being," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  6. Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt, 1996. "Markets with posted prices: recent results from the laboratory," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(3), pages 291-320, September.
  7. Jordi Brandts & Arno Riedl & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Competition and Well-Being," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-041/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Giorgio Coricelli & Luigi Luini, 1999. "Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties," CEEL Working Papers 9901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:39-53. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.