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Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition

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  • Osborne Martin J.

Abstract

I first show that if there are more than two potential candidates in the Hotelling- Downs model of the simultaneous choice of positions by politicians then an equilibrium fails to exist in a wide range of situations. Subsequently I study a temporal model in which candidates are free to act whenever they wish. For the case of three potential candidates I nd that in every equilibrium exactly one candidate enters. There is always an equilibrium in which the position cho- sen by the entrant is the median: the only other possibility is that the position chosen is far from the median.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 5 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 133-151

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:133-151

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. B.Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1972. "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 87, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 139-56, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Osborne, Martin J., 2000. "Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 41-62, July.
  2. Selim Ergun, 2008. "Centrist's Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints," ThE Papers, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. 08/06, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
  3. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  4. Julio González-Díaz & Federica Briata & Ignacio García-Jurado & Fioravante Patrone, 2012. "Essential collections for equilibrium concepts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 517-552, August.
  5. Valeska Groenert, 2013. "Trimmed equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 99-114, February.
  6. Juan Carlos Berganza, 2000. "Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 501-543, September.
  7. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2007. "Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics 07-03, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  8. Frank Page Jr & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Elections and strategic positioning games," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 63-83, August.
  9. Georges Casamatta & Philippe Donder, 2005. "On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 1-29, October.
  10. Brusco, Sandro & Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep, 2012. "The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 447-469.
  11. Jaideep Roy & Marcin Dziubinski, 2008. "Electoral Competition amongst Citizen-candidates and Downsian Politicians," CEDI Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University 08-10, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  12. Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Andaluz-Funcia, Joaquín & Gil-Sanz, Agustín, 2011. "An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 74-83, January.

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