Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play
AbstractWhenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflict. In this paper we propose an extensive-form game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of the Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Ferreira, J.L. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Papers 9217, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- J.L. Ferreira, 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Papers 988, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ferreira, J. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Paper 1992-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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