Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play
Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflict. In this paper we propose an extensive-form game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of the Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.
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|Date of creation:||1992|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: TILBURG UNIVERSITY, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 5000 LE TILBURG THE NETHERLANDS.|
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- Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 421-433.
- Charles Blackorby & David Nissen & Daniel Primont & R. Robert Russell, 1973. "Consistent Intertemporal Decision Making," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 239-248.
- Peter J. Hammond, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 159-173.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
- Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014.
"Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,
in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Machina, Mark J, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1622-68, December.
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