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"Impossibility of speculation" theorems with noisy information

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  • Sonsino, Doron

Abstract

The "impossibility of speculations" result implied by some models of information economics seems to follow directly from the strong assumptions concerning the information structure in the relevant models. This paper investigates whether the impossibility result hold when some "noise" is introduced into the information system in a "no trade" model. It is proved that when the degree of noise approaches zero, the noisy model converges to the impossibility result of the no-noise model. Yet it is shown that the introduction of some positive noise into the information system can disrupt the impossibility result in many applications. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 024, 026.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonsino, Doron, 1995. ""Impossibility of speculation" theorems with noisy information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 406-423.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:406-423
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robin Hanson, 2003. "For Bayesian Wannabes, Are Disagreements Not About Information?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 105-123, March.
    2. Angrisani Marco & Guarino Antonio & Huck Steffen & Larson Nathan C, 2011. "No-Trade in the Laboratory," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-58, April.
    3. Ido Erev & Sharon Gilat-Yihyie & Davide Marchiori & Doron Sonsino, 2015. "On loss aversion, level-1 reasoning, and betting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 113-133, February.
    4. Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1997. "Commonp-Belief: The General Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 73-82, January.
    5. Nimark, Kristoffer P. & Pitschner, Stefan, 2019. "News media and delegated information choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 160-196.

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