Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 5 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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- Carolyn Pitchik, 1998.
"Irreversible, Unobservable, Costly Investment in the Presence of Rivals,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 77-91, February.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 1996. "Irreversible, Unobservable, Costly Investment in the Presence of Rivals," Working Papers pitchik-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Wiseman, 2006.
"Reputation and Impermanent Types,"
2006 Meeting Papers
650, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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