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Cooperation in a one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma

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  • Harrington, Joseph Jr.
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    Abstract

    In this paper, we model social interactions which are characteristic of large economies. The key properties of this model are: (1) agents are randomly matched over time to engage in a Prisoners' Dilemma; (2) each agent routinely interacts with a proper subset of the other agents; and (3) each agent has highly imperfect information about the past conduct of other agents. For this setting, we show the optimality of a rule of thumb which does not discriminate between encounters with agents that one regularly meets and encounters with agents that one never expects to meet again. This rule of thumb generates cooperative behavior in all encounters. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D74.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 8 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 364-377

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:364-377

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    1. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
    2. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1987. "Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 233-237.
    3. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    4. Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 1988. "A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 281-287, December.
    5. DANIEL B. KLElN, 1992. "Promise Keeping In The Great Society: A Model Of Credit Information Sharing," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 117-136, 07.
    6. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    7. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, 03.
    8. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    9. Rosenthal, R W, 1979. "Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1353-66, November.
    10. Basu, Kaushik, 1987. "Modeling finitely-repeated games with uncertain termination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 147-151.
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    Cited by:
    1. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Lippert, Steffen, 2004. "Networks of Relations," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 570, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 03 May 2005.
    2. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, . "Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility," IEW - Working Papers 076, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Illtae Ahn & Matti Suominen, . ""Word-of-Mouth Communication and Community Enforcement''," CARESS Working Papres 96-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    4. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2001. "Beyond Bentham – Measuring Procedural Utility," CESifo Working Paper Series 492, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2010. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 559, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    6. Mari Rege, 2000. "Networking Strategy: Cooperate Today in Order to Meet a Cooperator Tomorrow," Discussion Papers 282, Research Department of Statistics Norway.

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