IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "Computing Multi-Period, Information Constrained Optima"

by Christopher Phelan & Robert M Townsend

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 72-105, September.
  2. Williamson, Stephen, 1997. "Payments Systems with Random Matching and Private Information," Working Papers 97-21, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  3. Wang, Cheng, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Staff General Research Papers 5248, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Liu, Xuemei, 2008. "The monetary compensation mechanism: An alternative to the clean development mechanism," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 289-297, June.
  5. Sleet, Christopher, 2001. "On Credible Monetary Policy and Private Government Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 338-376, July.
  6. Attanasio, Orazio & Davis, Steven J, 1996. "Relative Wage Movements and the Distribution of Consumption," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1227-62, December.
  7. Khan, A. & Ravikumar, B., 1997. "Growth and Risk-Sharing with Private Information," Working Papers 97-13, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  8. Cheng Wang & Anthony Smith, . "Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium," GSIA Working Papers 2000-27, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  9. Borys Grochulski, 2008. "Optimal personal bankruptcy design : A Mirrlees approach," Working Paper 08-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  10. Fernandes, Ana & Phelan, Christopher, 2000. "A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 223-247, April.
  11. Smith, Bruce D. & Wang, Cheng, 1998. "Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance," Staff General Research Papers 5194, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  12. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers 1491, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Kocherlakota, Narayana & Pistaferri, Luigi, 2005. "Asset Pricing Implications of Pareto Optimality with Private Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4930, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Aiyagari, S.R. & Williamson, S.D., 1997. "Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information," Working Papers 97-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  15. Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April.
  16. Nicola Pavoni & G. L. Violante, 2007. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 283-318.
  17. Laurence Ales & Maziero Pricila, . "Accounting for Private Information," GSIA Working Papers 2010-E58, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  18. Rasmus Lentz & Torben Tranas, 2005. "Job Search and Savings: Wealth Effects and Duration Dependence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(3), pages 467-490, July.
  19. Mikhail Golosov & Narayana Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2002. "Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000449, www.najecon.org.
  20. Casella, Alessandra, 2002. "Storable Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 3508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Jean-Olivier Hairault & François Langot & Sébastien Ménard & Thepthida Sopraseuth, 2012. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00668989, HAL.
  22. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1994. "Macroeconomics with frictions," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 24-40.
  23. Lim, Y. & Townsend, R.M., 1997. "General Equilibrium Models of Financial Systems: Theory and Measurement in Village Economies," Papers 9716, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  24. Judd, Kenneth L., 1997. "Computational economics and economic theory: Substitutes or complements?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 907-942, June.
  25. Michael Kiley, 2002. "How Should Unemployment Benefits Respond to the Business Cycle?," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 167, Society for Computational Economics.
  26. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Steve, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy," Staff General Research Papers 5088, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  27. Larry Jones & Ali Shourideh & Roozbeh Hosseini, 2009. "Risk Sharing, Inequality and Fertility," 2009 Meeting Papers 153, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  28. Radim Bohacek, 2001. "Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Heterogeneous Agents and Moral Hazard," GE, Growth, Math methods 0012001, EconWPA.
  29. MUKOYAMA, Toshihiko & SAHIN, Aysegül, 2004. "Repeated Moral Hazard with Persistence," Cahiers de recherche 01-2004, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  30. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  31. Alexander Monge-Naranjo & Javier Cascante & Luis J. Hall, 2001. "Enforcement, Contract Design, and Default: Exploring the Financial Markets of Costa Rica," Research Department Publications 3126, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  32. Anna L. Paulson & Robert M. Townsend, 2003. "Distinguishing limited commitment from moral hazard in models of growth with inequality," Working Paper Series WP-03-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  33. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  34. Espino, Emilio, 2005. "On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 192-213, April.
  35. Stefania Albanesi & Christopher Sleet, 2006. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30.
  36. Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1997. "Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 282-305, February.
  37. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating," Staff General Research Papers 10133, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  38. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications," NBER Working Papers 12778, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  39. Christopher Phelan, 2005. "Opportunity and social mobility," Staff Report 323, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  40. Radim Bohacek, 2001. "Capital Accumulation And Moral Hazard In An Economy With Heterogeneous Agents," CeNDEF Workshop Papers, January 2001 1B.2, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  41. Santos Monteiro, Paulo, 2008. "Family Labor Supply and Aggregate Saving," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 875, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  42. Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 781-803, October.
  43. Gauthier, C. & Poitevin, M., 1994. "Using Ex-ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 9402, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  44. Marco LiCalz & Alessandro Pavan, 2002. "Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers 1495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  45. Abraham, Arpad & Pavoni, Nicola, 2004. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending," Working Papers 04-05, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  46. YiLi Chien & Hanno Lustig, 2010. "The Market Price of Aggregate Risk and the Wealth Distribution," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(4), pages 1596-1650, April.
  47. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 12224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  48. Kyna Fong, 2007. "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  49. John H. Cochrane & Lars Peter Hansen, 1992. "Asset Pricing Explorations for Macroeconomics," NBER Working Papers 4088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  50. Christopher Phelan, 2002. "Inequality and fairness," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr.
  51. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78.
  52. Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, . "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  53. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach in a model of regulatory banking capital," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 23-50.
  54. Robert J. Shiller, 1997. "Expanding the Scope of Individual Risk Management: Moral Hazard and Other Behavioral Considerations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1145, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  55. Antonio Mele, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard and Recursive Lagrangeans," 2008 Meeting Papers 482, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  56. Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Consommation, partage de risque et assurance informelle : développements théoriques et tests empiriques récents," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(1), pages 115-149, Mars.
  57. Peter M. DeMarzo & Yuliy Sannikov, 2004. "A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure," NBER Working Papers 10615, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  58. Wen-Fang Liu, 1998. "Heterogeneous Agent Economies with Knightian Uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0053, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  59. Christopher Phelan, 2003. "Opportunity and Social Mobility," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000379, UCLA Department of Economics.
  60. Andreas Lehnert, 1998. "Asset pooling, credit rationing, and growth," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-52, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  61. Alexander Karaivanov, 2003. "Financial Contracts and Occupational Choice," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 25, Society for Computational Economics.
  62. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1993. "Explaining financial market facts: the importance of incomplete markets and transaction costs," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 17-31.
  63. Daron Acemoglu & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2007. "Political Economy of Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000886, UCLA Department of Economics.
  64. Temzelides, Ted & Williamson, Stephen D., 2001. "Payments Systems Design in Deterministic and Private Information Environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 297-326, July.
  65. Alexander Karaivanov, 2002. "Computing Moral Hazard Programs With Lotteries Using Matlab," Computational Economics 0201001, EconWPA.
  66. Robert Townsend & Rolf Mueller, 1998. "Mechanism Design and Village Economies: From Credit, to Tenancy, to Cropping Groups," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 119-172, January.
  67. Menard, Sebastien, 2006. "Optimal unemployment insurance with non-separable preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 267-271, November.
  68. William D. Dupor & Andreas Lehnert, 2002. "Increasing returns and optimal oscillating labor supply," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-22, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  69. John Rust & Richard Staelin, 2011. "Rust’s and Staelin’s Comments on: “A structural model of sales force compensation dynamics: estimation and field implementation” by Sanjog Misra and Harikesh Nair," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 259-265, September.
  70. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
  71. Mason, Robin & Välimäki, Juuso, 2008. "Dynamic Moral Hazard and Project Completion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.