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Adverse Selection, Risk Sharing and Business Cycles

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  • Marcelo Veracierto

Abstract

I consider a real business cycle model in which agents have private information about an idiosyncratic shock to their value of leisure. I consider the mechanism design problem for this economy and describe a computational method to solve it. This is an important contribution of the paper since the method could be used to solve a wide class of models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty. Calibrating the model to U.S. data I find a striking result: That the information frictions that plague the economy have no effects on business cycle fluctuations.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo Veracierto, 2014. "Adverse Selection, Risk Sharing and Business Cycles," Working Paper Series WP-2014-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2014-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Gokmen, Gunes & Morin, Annaig, 2021. "Investment shocks and inequality dynamics," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 570-579.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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