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Expanding the Scope of Individual Risk Management: Moral Hazard and Other Behavioral Considerations

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Abstract

There is a large potential for improving individual risk management through new risk management contracts and associated new index-settled derivatives. However, there are some difficult problems in designing contracts so that they will be used effectively. Individuals have idiosyncratic individual risks that can be hedged only at some real resource cost due to moral hazard. Individuals seem to exhibit behavior indicative of lack of appreciation of the principles of risk management. These problems are discussed, and some potential new risk management contracts that would make improvements in the management of major income risks are proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert J. Shiller, 1997. "Expanding the Scope of Individual Risk Management: Moral Hazard and Other Behavioral Considerations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1145, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wagner, W.B., 2000. "Decentralized International Risk Sharing and Governmental Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper 2000-92, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Wagner, W.B., 2000. "Decentralized International Risk Sharing and Governmental Moral Hazard," Other publications TiSEM e1835d1b-f90b-4907-be6c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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